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ORDER OUT OF CHAOS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
DESIGN-DEFECT LAW
Dominick Vetri *
"Simple. Elegant. Elusive. Order from chaos." **
I. INTRODUCTION
Products liability design-defect law appears to be in a state of
disorder. All of the different design-defect tests used by the state
courts' give the appearance of chaos in American products liabili-
ty law. The states have failed to develop a strong consensus on a
legal test for design defects.2 It is, of course, an exaggeration to
say that there are as many different legal tests for design defects
as there are states, but in a world in which products are routinely
shipped in foreign and interstate commerce, there is a need for
more uniformity. Fortunately, appearances are not what they
seem. There is surprising harmony among the states in the proof
requirements to establish a prima facie case of design defect.3 The
treatment of design-defect cases has been remarkably uniform
* Copyright 2008. Kliks Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School; J.D.,
1964, University of Pennsylvania; B.S.M.E., 1960, New Jersey Institute of Technology.
The author expresses his deep appreciation for the superb research assistance of Universi-
ty of Oregon Law School graduates Christopher Walther, Anne Cohen, Terry Miller, Mi-
chael Stephenson, Caryn Ackerman, and Kim Clark. I also thank Oregon attorney Jona-
than Hoffman, and California attorneys Elizabeth Cabraser, Paul Nelson, Jennifer Pruski,
Michael Reitzell, and Michael Kelly, for their willingness to share their expertise and
knowledge about products liability law. Any errors are, of course, mine.
** IAN STEWART, DOES GOD PLAY DICE: THE NEW MATHEMATICS OF CHAOS 3 (2d ed.
2002).
1. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects-A Survey of the
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, app. at 951-55 (1996) (identify-
ing fourteen different design-defect tests used by the states, with ten of the states employ-
ing multiple tests).
2. See id.
3. See infra Part IV.
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throughout the United States at the proof level, despite what
might seem to be inordinate disorder at the design-defect test and
jury-instruction levels. There is a simple elegance at the proof
level that does not exist at the legal test level.
It is a familiar story of how the judicial opinions of two Ameri-
can state court judges, Justice Roger Traynor of California and
Justice John Francis of New Jersey, and the torts scholarship of
Dean William Prosser, culminated in the American Law Insti-
tute's ("ALI") adoption in 1965 of strict products liability in sec-
tion 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement
Second").4 Section 402A caught on like wildfire in American state
courts.5 No single doctrinal common law principle was ever
adopted so widely and quickly in the United States as strict prod-
ucts liability. This undoubtedly reflected the consumer age, the
high level of accidents involving consumer products, and the con-
siderable inadequacies of warranty law.6 The wave of reform sub-
sequently led to a European Union strict products liability law in
the form of the European Directive on Products Liability in 1985.'
The primary goal of products liability legal reform was the de-
velopment of a liability law that emphasized a consumer-safety
perspective and reduced the burdensome proof requirements of
negligence law. These objectives were to be achieved by moving
from negligence to strict liability principles of culpability and the
use of a consumer-safety-expectations test of defectiveness.8 Just-
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69, 100 (N.J. 1960); George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original In-
tent, 10 CARDOzO L. REV. 2301, 2307-08 (1989).
5. Vargo, supra note 1, at 507.
6. See Priest, supra note 4, at 2304-07.
7. Article 6 of the European Directive provides:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
would be put; [and]
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better
product is subsequently put into circulation.
Council Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (EC).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("The article sold must
be -dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary con-




ice Traynor eloquently made the case for this shift as early as
1944:
Even if there is no negligence.., public policy demands that respon-
sibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards
to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the mar-
ket. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot.
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to
meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the man-
ufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing busi-
ness. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of prod-
ucts having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products
nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public inter-
est to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manu-
facture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however ha-
phazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant
risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general
and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to af-
ford such protection.
9
In the years since, it is clear that these goals have not been
achieved in the most significant area of products liability litiga-
tion-design defect.10 Product design defects are the predominate
type of litigated cases today, and they have proven to be the most
intractable to such reforms.1' American courts have openly
shifted back to negligence principles in design-defect cases in
substance, if not in language, by requiring risk-utility proof,
which is the crux of negligence. 2 European courts, essentially,
have come to the same place by treating their expectations test as
a normative test-a reasonable person expectations test-
9. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
10. The objectives have been achieved in the manufacturing or production defect cas-
es. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 4, at 2324-26.
11. MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 85 & n.1 (2006). Geist-
feld relies on an insurance report studying 1985 data that found that, for claims over
$100,000, strict liability was the primary liability theory and seventy-five percent of the
claims were based on a design-defect theory. See id. (citing Alliance of Am. Insurers & Am.
Ins. Ass'n, A Study of Large Product Liability Claims Closed in 1985 (1986)).
12. See Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union-Not a United
States Analog, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REv. 341, 354 (2000).
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allowing consideration of risk-utility proof in design-defect
cases.
13
The many different design-defect legal tests that developed in
the United States after section 402A give the appearance of dis-
order in American products liability law. But such an impression
is inaccurate. If we focus not on the legal tests, but on the proof
acceptable to make out a prima facie case of design defect, there
is considerable uniformity among the courts.
Years of experience with products liability litigation have
taught us not only that most design-defect cases of necessity re-
quire consideration of risk-utility proof to ascertain defectiveness,
but also, importantly, that some do not. Those design-defect cases
that require risk-utility evidence to establish defectiveness-
herein described as the "safety-adequacy cases"-require a ba-
lancing of competing considerations in determining whether the
product was reasonably safe, and they are essentially indistin-
guishable from applying negligence law.14 Examples of safety-
adequacy cases include (1) the safest location for a car's gas tank
to avoid leakage and fires after a collision, (2) the height of a
sports utility vehicle's ("SUV") front bumper to lessen interior pe-
netration of side collisions, and (3) the feasibility of a safety de-
vice that turns off a power boat's ignition if the operator is thrown
overboard. In these cases risk, feasibility, cost, and utility im-
13. C.J. MILLER & R.S. GOLDBERG, PRODUCT LIABILITY §§ 11.24, 11.41 (2d ed. 2004);
Spacone, supra note 12, at 355-56.
14. Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow:
Negligence and Strict Liability in Design Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006)
("If risk-utility tradeoffs are to be utilized to decide whether a design is defective, then
there is no difference between negligence and strict liability. The Products Liability Res-
tatement (Third) requiring a 'comparison between an alternative design and the product
design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person,' is
the identical test utilized in deciding whether a defendant was negligent. In both, a fact-
finder must determine whether a reasonable person would find that the product did not
meet the reasonableness standard. That hypothetical reasonable person stands in judg-
ment of the manufacturer in negligence cases and decides not whether a 'reasonable man-
ufacturer' would have adopted the proposed design alternative, but whether a 'reasonable
person' reflecting the values of society would have adopted the alternative design. The de-
cision whether to adopt an alternative design must be decided by an objective, reasonable
person. Robots do not make design decisions, human designers do. Juries sit in judgment
on those decisions and do so from an objective perspective. There simply is no difference
between reviewing the conduct of the manufacturer and the product design. Ultimately,
products are neither reasonable nor unreasonable; they are deemed so only because a hu-
man fact-finder utilizing risk-utility tradeoffs decides one way or another on the issue.")
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pairment must be considered in determining whether a product is
defective or has a reasonably safe design.15
There are, however, design-defect cases in which courts allow
the use of alternative types of proof, such as circumstantial evi-
dence establishing defectiveness when products malfunction un-
der normal use, safety regulation violations, misleading safety
representations arising from product advertising or promotional
literature, easily curable manifest defects such as the failure to
use skid-proof material in slippery situations, unwholesome food,
and other categories developed below.16 Allowing alternative proof
in such situations is more consonant with the initial consumer
safety protection law reform goals underlying section 402A.
17
Identifying such alternative-proof categories permits a meaning-
ful consumer-safety-oriented liability principle to operate in some
design-defect contexts rather than yielding to the negligence risk-
utility standard in all design-defect cases.
The SUV rollover cases can serve as a useful paradigm for
some of the problems discussed in this article. The defectiveness
of a Toyota 4Runner SUV that tripped and rolled over on a high-
way while the driver was performing an ordinary road-hazard
evasive maneuver can be shown at trial through traditional risk-
utility evidence.'" It is, however, a complex and difficult process
requiring extensive discovery and the services of expert wit-
nesses, and it is very expensive. 9 Such an evidentiary undertak-
ing can only be done in cases involving catastrophic injuries that
warrant the expense.
In some SUV accidents, it might be possible instead to merely
prove, through the driver and other witnesses, circumstantial
evidence sufficient to raise a jury question as to the car's defec-
tiveness. In Denny v. Ford Motor Co., the driver was proceeding
15. See, e.g., Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974); see C.L. Mike Schmidt, Cross-Examination of an Expert Witness, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J.
89, 98-99 & n.40 (1981); Kevin Case, Note, Tanks in the Streets: SUVs, Design Defects,
and Ultrahazardous Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 149, 171-72 (2006).
16. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 F.2d 443, 454 (1978); discussion infra Part
V.B.1-8. The concept of "alternative proof" developed in the article has nothing to do with
the required evidence of a "reasonable alternative design" in the Restatement (Third) on
Products Liability ("Restatement (Third)"). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt. c (1965).
18. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 323,331-32 (Or. 2001).
19. See David G. Owen, Design Defects, 73 Mo. L. REV. 291, 320 (2008).
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at the speed limit on a clear, dry day, when a deer dashed out in
front of the vehicle; the driver undertook a normal evasive ma-
neuver by turning the steering wheel to the right to avoid the
deer, and then back again once past the deer, to regain his posi-
tion in the roadway.2 ° The witnesses described how, instead of re-
gaining the roadway in a stable position, the SUV tripped on it-
self and rolled over, injuring the passengers.21 This circumstan-
tial evidence could be sufficient, on its own, to raise a jury ques-
tion regarding the defectiveness of the SUV, without additional
risk-utility evidence on how the SUV could have been more safely
designed.22 In some situations, even television commercials and
other advertising materials showing the SUJV performing evasive
maneuvers in similar circumstances may be enough to establish a
prima facie case of a defective design.23 Attorneys in such cases
typically introduce risk-utility proof in addition to evidence of
misleading advertising if they can, but in some circumstances it
should be enough to prove the misrepresented performance capa-
bilities in the advertising.
2 4
This article explores the borderland between the design-defect
cases requiring risk-utility proof to establish defectiveness and
those categories of design cases where alternative proof is allowa-
ble. Risk-utility proof is required in most design-defect cases,
namely safety-adequacy cases,2 5 but there are isolated design con-
texts in which alternative forms of proof are permissible. The al-
ternative-proof cases are often less expensive and less burden-
some to prove, thereby better achieving the law reform goals of
the ALI in section 402A.26 Case law has already identified several
product-accident contexts in which alternative proof is, and
should be, allowed.27 At least eight existing or emerging catego-
ries of design-defect cases allowing for alternative proof are dis-
cussed, and the types of alternative proof are identified and ana-
lyzed.28 There does not appear to be a unifying theme to these
alternative proof categories, but their identification nonetheless
20. 662 N.E.2d 730, 731, 738 (N.Y. 1995).
21. Seeid. at 731.
22. See id. at 738-39.
23. See McCathern, 23 P.3d at 332.
24. See id.
25. See Twerski, supra note 14, at 12.
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
27. See discussion infra Part V.A.
28. See discussion infra Part V.B.1-8.
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serves a useful purpose in organizing and simplifying design-
defect law.
An understanding of the alternative-proof categories is helpful
because it provides guidance to courts in understanding the ap-
plicable legal test and the appropriate instructions to give juries,
enables attorneys to plan and develop more easily the requisite
legal and evidentiary strategy for their cases, allows products lia-
bility law to develop in a more sensible and coherent fashion, and
allows the law to better approximate the original reform objec-
tives of products liability law. The article demonstrates the con-
tinuing value of the common law process, which allows the law to
evolve over time as a result of the analysis of succeeding cases.
Part II of this article discusses the evolution of products liabili-
ty design-defect law. Part III describes the struggles to bring de-
sign defects within a regime of strict liability. Part IV discusses
harmonization at the proof level in design-defect cases. Part V
lays out a number of design-defect contexts appropriate for alter-
native proof. Part VI explains the products liability common law
process. Finally, Part VII summarizes the importance of distin-
guishing the different categories of design-defect cases.
II. EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY DESIGN-DEFECT LAW
A. Historical Background
Prior to the 1960s, manufacturers were rarely held liable for
defective products. The law had provided two principal theories
for persons suffering injuries caused by defective products-
implied warranty of merchantability and negligence-but inter-
posed substantial barriers to recovery.29
Under the implied-warranty theory of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."), sellers provide an implied warranty that their
goods are "merchantable," in other words "fit for the ordinary
29. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965). An express warranty
theory was also available if a plaintiff could establish an express promise of safety by con-
tract terms, product literature, or advertising. See Hunter v. Woodburn Fertilizer, Inc.,
144 P.3d 970, 973 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). The tort theory of misrepresentation might also be
applicable if the plaintiff could establish false claims of safety in the marketing of the
goods.
2009] 1379
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purposes for which goods of that description are used."3° The buy-
er does not have to prove negligence to recover.31 Sellers may,
however, eliminate or curtail liability through a number of strat-
egies allowed by the U.C.C.32 Many states eventually passed spe-
cial consumer protection statutes to ameliorate some of these
problems.3
The common law allowed recovery where sellers were negli-
gent.34 However, immediate sellers are rarely negligent regarding
consumer goods because they have no hand in their design or
production. After MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., however, man-
ufacturers could be held liable in negligence to remote purchasers
and bystanders for negligently designed or manufactured prod-
ucts. 35 Even so, a plaintiff might have identified a defect but
usually could not prove the specific carelessness that resulted in
the defect. And challenges to product design decisions were vir-
tually unheard of until the 1960s. Proving negligence, however,
continued to be a difficult, if not insurmountable, burden. Even if
negligence could be proven, defenses such as the open and ob-
vious danger rule, contributory negligence as a total bar to recov-
ery, assumption of risk, and scope of liability limitations typically
precluded liability.36 As a result of the difficulties with negligence
30. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) 2008).
31. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 149.
32. For example, sellers can avoid liability if(l) by contract, they properly disclaim an
implied warranty or expressly limit the available remedies under U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2), (4),
2-719; (2) the injured person was not a purchaser of the product (i.e., no privity of contract)
and does not qualify as a third-party beneficiary under U.C.C. § 2-318; (3) the buyer fails
to give reasonably prompt and full notice of the claim under U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a); or (4) the
product is considered merchantable because it matched customary industry design stan-
dards for such products under U.C.C. § 2-314(2).
33. See Joseph M. Price & Rachel F. Bond, Litigation as a Tool in Food Advertising:
Consumer Protection Statutes, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 277, 279 (2006) ("Today, every state
has some version of a consumer protection statute.").
34. See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibil-
ity, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1993) (noting the shift from a negligence standard to a
strict liability standard); Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 44, 44
(1956) (noting the applicability of the negligence standard); Page Keeton, Products Liabili-
ty-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REV. 675, 675-76 (1963) (describing
negligence as one of the basic product liability claims); David Owen, Products Liability
Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1998) [hereinafter, Owen, Products Liablity] (dis-
cussing negligence liability for the sale of defective products).
35. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
36. See Campo v. Scofield, 95 N.E.2d 802 804 (N.Y. 1950) (establishing the patent
danger rule); Davis, supra note 31, at 1231 (discussing the patent danger rule and other
common law obstacles to recovery); Dix W. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Con-
tributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 105-28 (1972) (discuss-
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and sales contract law, few persons successfully recovered for in-
juries caused by design defects before the mid-1960s. 7
Then, in 1960 and 1962, New Jersey and California took a
dramatic common law turn, extending strict liability tort concepts
to product accidents in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.3"
and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.3 9 In 1964, the ALI,
under the leadership of Dean Prosser, followed suit and adopted
the principle of strict products liability in section 402A in re-
sponse to deficiencies in the existing accident law.40 After the
adoption of section 402A, courts across the country decided that,
in product accident cases, the principle of strict liability contained
in the Restatement (Second) should apply.41 Courts adopted this
new principle not only in light of the expanding consumer goods
economy, but also to provide optimum safety incentives for manu-
facturers and greater assurances of compensation for consum-
ers.42 The number of product accident cases filed in the courts in-
creased considerably in the ensuing decades.43
The shift in American tort law towards greater protection for
consumer and worker safety in the use of products was actually
brought about by a number of changes. First in importance was
the new strict liability focus presented by section 402A.4 Second,
two reforms in the pre-trial discovery rules improved products ac-
cident claims: (a) eliminating the requirement that a party estab-
lish "good cause" to discover relevant documents,45 considerably
ing contributory negligence and assumption of risk as bars to recovery).
37. See Davis, supra note 33, at 1231-32 (noting the removal of many barriers to re-
covery, in the 1960s); David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV.
LITIG. 955, 966-67 (2007) [hereinafter Owen, The Evolution] (discussing the spread of de-
sign defect cases after the 1960s).
38. 161 A.2d 69, 77 (N.J. 1960)
39. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmt. c (1965); Owen, The Evolution,
supra note 37, at 974-77; Owen, Products Liability, supra note 34, at 277.
41. See Owen, The Evolution, supra note 37, at 977; Owen, Products Liability, supra
note 34, at 277.
42. See William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799 (1966).
43. Rama Yeikur et al., Product Liability: Its Impact on the Auto Industry, Consumers,
and Global Competitiveness, 44 Bus. HORIZONS 61, 62 (2001).
44. See Owen, The Evolution, supra note 37, at 974-77 (discussing section 402A and
the strict liability standard); Owen, Products Liability, supra note 34, at 276-78.
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes (1970 amendment). The discovery
rules were changed in December 2006 to provide that a party need not make available
electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as "not reasonably
20091 1381
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enhanced relevant document discovery; and (b) providing the abil-
ity to learn the defendant's theory of the case before trial through
defense expert report and deposition discovery enabled plaintiffs
to better prepare and present their cases. 46 Also, a third impor-
tant reason was the growing expertise and sophistication in the
plaintiffs' trial bar and the defense bar in preparing and litigating
complex defective product cases.47
The comments to section 402A make it clear that the new "rule
is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to
the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of the product., 48 A plaintiff un-
der section 402A must show that the product was in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. 49
Thus, it appears that sellers are liable for injuries from product
defects without a showing of negligence. Additionally, under sec-
tion 402A, disclaimers of warranty and liability are not enforcea-
ble, and privity of contract is not required. °
In the flood of cases after the adoption of section 402A, courts
began to recognize that there were three basic types of product
defects: (1) manufacturing defects, (2) design defects, and (3)
warning deficiencies. 1 The drafters of section 402A probably had
accessible because of undue burden or cost." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); see also Jason
Krouse, E-Discovery Gets Real, 93 A.B.A. J. 44, 48 (2007) (discussing how to determine
what electronic evidence is accessible). The court, however, may compel discovery of such
information on a showing of "good cause." FED R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(2)(B). It is debatable wheth-
er the products liability revolution would have occurred anyway under a negligence regime
because of the significant discovery rule changes. Certainly, the volume of design-defect
cases where negligence principles dominate is some evidence that the discovery rules were
a critical component of change. Even today, many years after the adoption of section 402A,
many attorneys typically plead negligence and strict liability claims in their complaints.
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
47. See generally Susan Brodie Haire et al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and
Judicial Decionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 667 (1999) (de-
scribing the expertise in the defense and plaintiffs bar in products liability).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) & cmt. a (1965). It might be ques-
tioned whether section 402A really creates strict liability. True strict liability requires on-
ly a causal connection with conduct without any showing of culpability. If the products lia-
bility cases subject to section 402A were limited to manufacturing defect cases and design
malfunction cases, strict liability would be an accurate characterization. Of course, there
is strict liability under section 402A on all sellers in the marketing chain besides the man-
ufacturer.
49. Id. § 402A(1).
50. Id. § 402A(2)(b) & cmt. m.
51. David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377, 1378-79 (2004)
[hereinafter Owen, The Puzzle].
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in mind that the provision would only apply to manufacturing de-
fects and to those design defects which made a product unfit for
normal use. The language of section 402A, however, was not so
circumscribed, and the provision was applied by the courts to all
types of defects in all situations.12 This caused considerable diffi-
culties.
B. The Common Law Process in Design-Defect Cases
Section 402A was the guiding framework for products liability
law for thirty-four years. It was not without its problems, as it
was drafted when product accident claims were not prevalent and
it did not anticipate the consequences of the inherently more dif-
ficult area of complex design-defect litigation. In the design-defect
cases, the courts became accustomed to invoking the strict liabili-
ty language of section 402A in their opinions, even though they
were often actually applying negligence principles. 3 The jury in-
structions often used the Restatement (Second) consumer expecta-
tions test ("CET"), but the proof required was usually the same or
similar to the risk-utility proof in a negligence case. 14
The three cases upon which American strict products liability
was originally premised, Escola, Henningsen, and Greenman,
were actually all cases of "product malfunction" under normal
use. In the product malfunction context, the application of strict
liability's CET makes eminent sense whether the defect is a
manufacturing flaw or a design defect.
In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., involving a bottle of Coke
handled normally that exploded and seriously injured a waitress,
the majority applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.55 Justice
Traynor concurred, however, arguing that strict liability prin-
ciples should apply.56 In the warranty case Henningsen v. Bloom-
field Motors, Inc., the power steering of a recently purchased
52. Id. at 1378.
53. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, The Proposed Basic Principles Res-
tatement, and Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1085, 1091-92 (2002).
54. See id. at 1094. There were several areas where there was a distinct difference,
two of which are of considerable importance: (1) under section 402A the courts did apply
strict liability to defects that arose in the manufacturing process as opposed to defects in
product design, and (2) all intermediate sellers in the marketing chain such as retailers,
wholesalers, and importers are strictly liable for product defects-not just manufacturers.
55. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 437, 440 (Cal. 1944).
56. Id. at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
2009] 1383
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Chrysler locked up, caused a crash, and injured the driver. The
court prohibited defensive limitations written into the contract of
sale and invoked the strict liability approach of implied warranty
of merchantability." And, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., Justice Traynor, in a tour de force, transformed products
liability law by applying strict liability principles to an accident
involving a multi-purpose lathe whose normal vibrations caused
the spinning wood block to fly out of the machine, injuring the
operator.59 In each of the three cases, the products were being
used in their normal, intended fashion, and the products failed to
perform in the manner reasonably expected in light of their na-
ture and function.6 ° The products could not safely perform their
intended or foreseeable functions; in other words, they malfunc-
tioned. 1
It is important to recognize that the first two cases, Escola and
Henningsen, were actually manufacturing defect cases concerned
with products that did not meet the manufacturers' own design
specifications. 2 They were defective products that should have
been caught by quality control systems. Not only do consumers
reasonably expect that such products will be safe in normal use,
they, and the law, also expect that manufacturers will meet their
own design specifications. Greenman, however, was clearly a de-
sign-defect case; the product was built according to its design
standards, but could fail in some foreseeable circumstances of
normal use.6 The lathe design was defective and dangerous be-
cause it didn't meet consumer expectations that it would operate
safely in normal use.'
Because section 402A was premised on these three cases, the
section was clearly intended to apply to manufacturing defects-
certainly at least to those design-defect cases which fit within the
product malfunction type of accident. Fairly soon after the flood-
57. 161 A.2d 69, 75 (N.J. 1960).
58. Id. at 69-70, 76-77.
59. 377 P.2d 897, 898, 901 (Cal. 1963); see Escola, 150 P.2d at 438.
60. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 898; Escola, 150 P.2d at 438; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at
75.
61. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 898; Escola, 150 P.2d at 438; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at
75.
62. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 439; Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 74-75, 80.




tide of products cases filed after section 402A, the courts learned
that most product-design-problem cases did not fit the mold of
product-malfunction cases.
The vast majority of design-related cases that are litigated to-
day are not malfunction cases, but rather involve questions of
whether the manufacturer incorporated adequate safety into the
product.6" A determination of inadequate safety-not the mal-
function-defines the defect.66 These types of defects are hereafter
described as "safety adequacy design defects." The overwhelming
numbers of design-defect cases in the courts today are based on
alleged inadequate safety in otherwise useful products.67 Product
designs with inadequate levels of safety can usually be deter-
mined to be defective only by concluding that the danger of the
risks outweigh the benefits of the product as designed.6" In other
words, these cases require a balancing of the products' risks of
harm against the feasibility of a safer design at reasonable cost,
without unduly sacrificing the utility of the product.69
Thus, most design-defect cases are not malfunction cases but
rather cases involving issues of how "safe" is "safe enough"-
safety adequacy design cases.7 ° Since perfect safety in any prod-
uct is not possible, consumers cannot expect perfectly safe prod-
ucts. Safety adequacy cases will typically involve expert proof of
whether the design was an acceptable compromise of the multiple
considerations including safety, functionality, cost, and aesthet-
ics." To establish the dangerously defective nature of the product,
proof is usually required of an actual or potential alternative de-
sign that is safer, feasible, cost-effective, and does not impair the
utility of the product.72 In safety adequacy design-defect cases,
courts have required risk-utility proof and moved to legal tests
65. See 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5:5 (3d
ed. 2000).
66. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978); Aller v. Rodg-
ers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 1978).
67. See GEISTFELD, supra note 11, at 26-29, 106-07.
68. See id. at 106-07.
69. See id.
70. 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 65, § 5.5, at 292.
71. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 & n.4 (Cal. 1994); Owens
v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 377, 378-79 (Mich. 1982); see 2 OWEN ET AL.,
supra note 65, § 27:8, at 835, 837-39.
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2001); Peck v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 237 F.3d 614, 617-18 (6th Cir. 2001); Owens, 326 N.W.2d at 378-
79.
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and jury instructions whose language has a better fit with the
risk-utility proof submitted.73
In this milieu, courts began to recognize that different legal
tests and proof requirements were appropriate for different types
of design defects. Safety adequacy design-defect cases could be
processed under a "reasonable safe design" test requiring risk-
utility proof, whereas design-malfunction cases and other cases
could be based on other evidence and perhaps governed by differ-
ent legal tests.74 With this recognition, however, came a difficult
dilemma for the courts: Why do the strict liability principles ap-
plied to safety adequacy design-defect cases requiring risk-utility
proof look and feel so much like a negligence approach? Indeed,
the risk-utility approach is based on Judge Learned Hand's fam-
ous negligence balancing formula, which he developed in 1947 in
United States v. Carroll Towing and in other cases.75 The next
section develops how the courts have dealt with this conundrum.
III. STRUGGLES To BRING DESIGN DEFECTS WITHIN A
REGIME OF STRICT LIABILITY
Because negligence is primarily based on a balancing of risk-
utility evidence, judges and commentators initially believed that
risk-utility proof would not be required to make out a prima facie
case of product defectiveness under strict liability. It was as-
sumed that other proof under the CET could be used instead.76 In
the early period after section 402A was adopted by the ALI, the
CET became the dominant legal test and jury instruction.77 In
subsequent cases, it turned out that the CET worked well in the
manufacturing defect and the warning defect contexts. But the
formulation proved unsatisfactory in the predominant number of
design-defect cases-the safety adequacy cases.
73. See 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d (West) §§ 17:32-17:34 (rev. Nov. 1997).
74. See Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Mich. 1984).
75. See 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149
(2d Cir. 1949); Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). A version of the risk-
utility test was adopted in the first Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 291-
93 (1934); see Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula," 4
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 148 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Hand]. Professor Wright
points out that the first Restatement's version of the risk-utility test was not simply an
efficiency model, but incorporated significant justice principles. Id. at 148-49.
76. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 65, § 5:6, at 296-97.
77. George W. Conk, Punctual Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the
Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 801, 819 (2007).
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A. Consumer Expectations Test
The basic rule of section 402A is that strict liability applies if a
product "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer" causes injury.78 The comments to section 402A
elaborate the basic rule by declaring that a design is defective if a
product performs less safely than an ordinary consumer would
expect.79 Somewhat circularly, each of the phrases of the basic
rule, that is, "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous,"
is defined in section 402A's comments in terms of the ordinary
CET."° Although the CET works well for manufacturing-defects
and design-defect-malfunction cases, it poses serious problems in
safety adequacy cases.
The virtue of the CET is that it focuses on the point of view of
purchasers and users of products and allows proof of marketing,
advertising, presentation, promotional materials, product ma-
nuals, instruction booklets, warnings, and customary uses of a
product in evaluating whether a product design is safe.8' The
CET thereby heightens consumer protection as the significant
factor in products liability.
In implementing the CET, courts have been clear that the test
is objective-not a subjective test-in that the focus is on the or-
dinary user's expectations and not the expectations of the actual
user.8 2 Moreover, where a product's ordinary users are limited, as
with industrial or trade equipment, expert testimony as to what
the product's typical users expect is appropriate.8 3
There are, however, a significant number of situations where
the CET falters, and indeed, one can question whether consumer
expectations are capable of being measured in any meaningful
way. 4 Those contexts include products with open and obvious
dangers; situations where the plaintiff is a bystander rather than
a user or consumer; product accidents involving children; and
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
79. Id. at cmts. c, g, i.
80. Id. § 402A & cmts. c, g.
81. See, e.g., Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990).
82. See 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, §17:27 nn.34 & 36 (Supp. 2008).
83. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 & n.4 (Cal. 1994).
84. Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 863, 865-66 (2001).
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cases where the users do not have measurable safety expecta-
tions, but the technology is readily available to make the products
safer at a reasonable cost.
85
Many problems developed with the application of the CET in
design-defect cases. Foremost are the open and obvious defect
cases, which often call for an equitable conclusion-the opposite
of what the CET would require.86 For example, where a product
has a known or open and obvious danger, like the omission of a
safety guard on an industrial punch press or the omission of
child-proofing on butane cigarette lighters, the literal application
of the CET excuses a manufacturer from redesigning or adding an
available feasible safety device even when the danger could be
eliminated or substantially reduced at slight cost. The Supreme
Court of California describes such products as "embod[ying] 'ex-
cessive preventable danger."'87 Many courts, when confronted
with design-defect issues in such products, have found ways to
circumvent the harsh implications of the open and obvious danger
under the CET."8
These open and obvious danger examples raise the issue of
whether the CET is factual (descriptive and empirical) or norma-
tive (a standard). In other words, does the test require an inquiry
on what ordinary consumers do expect or what they should ex-
pect? As a factual test, the CET would only inquire as to the ac-
tual safety expectations of ordinary users and consumers, and
apparent dangers or risks would bar recovery. As a normative
test, however, the CET would inquire as to what ordinary users
and consumers should expect in terms of safe use. This normative
approach necessarily imports the concept of reasonableness.
Thus, in a normative use of the term, if the question put to the
jury asks what reasonable consumers should expect by way of
safety, a jury could consider an inexpensive alternative design
that would eliminate the risks even though the danger was open
and obvious. Under this normative approach, the apparency of
the risk might be primarily relevant only in comparative fault
evaluations. To avoid inequity, many courts have created an ex-
85. See generally Linda A. Sharo, Annotation, Products Liability: Consumer Expecta-
tions Test, 73 A.L.R. 5th 75, 143-59 (1999).
86. See Davis, supra note 34, at 1236; David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The
Meaning ofDefect, 39 MO. L. REV. 339, 348-52 (1974).
87. Soule, 882 P.2d at 305, 308 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454).
88. See AM. L. PRODS. LIAB. 3d, supra note 73, §17:27 nn.34 & 36 (Supp. 2008).
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ception in these open and obvious risk situations, allowing con-
sideration of risk-utility proof even if they continue to use a CET
jury instruction. 9
The CET's focus on consumer expectations also posed a prob-
lem for the courts because the consumer of a product frequently is
not the ultimate user. Factory machinery, commercial vehicles,
and airplanes are typically used by persons other than the pur-
chasers and operators. As a result, courts have had to stretch the
concept of "users" and the CET to "ordinary user" expectations. 90
The CET also poses problems where the victims are bystanders
rather than purchasers or users of the product.9' The descriptive
versus normative debate arises in this context as well. If the test
is descriptive, must the perspective of the test shift from the or-
dinary users or consumers to foreseeable bystanders in such cas-
es? In most cases, the potential shift in focus does not matter if
the defect risk to the users is as great or greater than it is to bys-
tanders, for example, where a defective power steering mechan-
ism poses serious risks to the car users as well as occupants of
other vehicles or pedestrians on the roadway.
In other cases, however, there may be a conflict of interest be-
tween users and bystanders. For example, many individuals buy
SUVs because they believe them to be safer because of their
weight, size, and height, and such individuals like riding higher
than other passenger vehicles.92 Unfortunately, the higher bum-
pers on many SUVs present a major vehicle-penetration risk to
the occupants of other cars in side collisions. 93 This increased pe-
netrability into other vehicles at leg or waist level has resulted in
many serious injuries to occupants in other cars.94 Evaluating de-
fectiveness solely from the ordinary purchaser or user's perspec-
tive in this situation makes little sense. Instead, the risks to fore-
seeable third parties must be part of the calculus.
89. See id.
90. See generally Donald Patterson, Judicial Determination: The Consumer Expecta-
tion Standard of Liability, 48 DEFENSE 24, 25-27 (2006), available at http://forthedefense.
org/contents.aspx?path=November,2006 (describing judicial responses to bystanding in-
jury).
91. See generally 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d., supra note 73, § 17:25.
92. See Stephanie Mencimer, Bumper Mentality: Americans Buy SUV's To Feel Safer.
They Should Buy Life Insurance, Too., 34 WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 44, 45.
93. Case, supra note 15, at 149.
94. See id. at 149-50.
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Moreover, consumers and users have the opportunity to inspect
for defects and purchase from reputable manufacturers, whereas
such opportunities are not available to bystanders.95 Yet a test ar-
ticulated in terms of bystander expectations would be absurd.
This anomaly has resulted in a variety of legal solutions: retain-
ing the CET in bystander cases, 96 expanding the notion of "con-
sumer" to include a spouse or family member who is a bystand-
er,97 changing the perspective from an ordinary to a reasonable
consumer (descriptive to normative),9" or applying a risk-utility
approach. 99
Similarly, children, particularly young children, typically have
no safety expectations regarding the products they use or con-
sume. In the butane lighter cases mentioned above, the children,
of course, were oblivious to the risks of fire by their conduct. If
the product is intended for children, the viewpoint is based on the
ordinary parent or adult consumer. °0 For adult products, courts
have held that the level of knowledge held by ordinary adult con-
sumers should be used as the test, even if a child was actually in-
jured by the product.1 ' The most sensible approach here would be
to use a normative standard of reasonable safety expectations
and allow the introduction of risk-utility evidence.'02
There is also the important question of what types of proof are
allowable under the CET. As indicated earlier, the focus is not on
the plaintiffs expectations, but on what ordinary consumers ex-
pect.'0° Experts and co-workers have been allowed to testify as to
safety expectations.' 4 Cross-examination of the plaintiff as to her
safety expectations has often proceeded without objection by
plaintiffs counsel.' °5 Parties may also look to the overall reported
95. Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Ca. 1969).
96. See, e.g., Horst v. Deere & Co., 752 N.W.2d 406, 411-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008).
97. See generally 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 648 (1997).
98. See Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993 F.2d 417, 420-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing
Sexton v. Bell Helmets, Inc., 926 F.2d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1991)).
99. See, e.g., Gomulka v. Yavapai Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986, 990 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1987).
100. 2 Am. L. Prod. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, § 17:26 (Supp. 2008).
101. Sharp, supra note 85, § 10[b]; Patterson, supra note 90, at 26.
102. Most courts when confronted with this issue have found ways to avoid the implica-
tions of the open and obvious danger rule under the CET. See 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d §
17:27 nn.34 & 36 (Supp. 2008).
103. Patterson, supra note 90, at 26.




accident record of the product as a gauge of consumer expecta-
tions. Few reported accidents may indicate that consumers can
work safely with the product; however, many reported accidents
may indicate the opposite. °6 If the product is in common usage,
the courts allow jurors to exercise their common-sense judgment
as to what ordinary consumers expect. 17 Where the product is not
a matter of common usage, experts may testify as to what level of
safety ordinary consumers of the product expect.0 8
A few courts have allowed the introduction of surveys of con-
sumer expectations, relying on the common practice of survey use
in trademark infringement cases."0 9 This is a problematic devel-
opment because of difficulties in framing unbiased questions, the
representativeness of those surveyed, and the lack of knowledge
of the respondents' backgrounds. Reliance on surveys may indi-
rectly make the CET a cumulation of subjective, rather than ob-
jective, expectations.' 0 It would be an unfortunate development
in products liability law to turn these cases into dueling surveys.
The imprecision of the CET and the lack of parameters to guide
decisions have motivated courts to resort to risk-utility principles
in design-defect cases."'
Most significantly, an overwhelming number of design-defect
cases involve products of great utility that cause harm, and these
typically require a careful balancing of the risks presented
against the potential safety improvements in order to determine
if the products should be characterized as defective or not. These
are the safety adequacy cases alluded to earlier."' In these cases,
the ordinary consumer may have no safety expectations to meas-
ure."3 For example, the location of a gas tank in an automobile
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 n.4 (Cal. 1994); Patterson, supra
note 90, at 29.
109. See, e.g., Hanbrick v. Ken-Bar Mfg. Co., 422 F. Supp. 2d 627, 639-40 (W.D. Va.
2002) (citing Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Tunnell v.
Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 707, 721, 723-24 (W.D. Va. 2004).
110. Patterson, supra note 90, at 67.
111. See Conk, supra note 77, at 819. An additional problem of the CET is that the
safety expectations of consumers at times will actually lag behind improved safety in new-
er products in the marketplace. Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1716 (2003).
112. See Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc. 808 P.2d 522, 524-25 (Nev. 1991).
113. See Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect
Litigation, 48 VAND. L. REV. 609, 612 (1995).
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involves a complex analysis of different potential locations for the
tank, the numbers and severity of accidents associated with each
location, and a complicated tradeoff of risks because of the poten-
tial for leakage and a resulting fire after a collision. The ordinary
consumer has no clear safety expectations as to gas tank locations
without being informed by experts. In such cases, courts have al-
lowed, even required, plaintiffs to proceed by offering risk-utility
proof. 114
In these cases, a subtle transformation of the CET into a nor-
mative standard takes place. The courts that continue to use the
CET in safety adequacy cases, requiring proof based on risk-
utility concepts, effectively modify the "ordinary consumer" into
the "reasonable consumer."11 Some courts openly use the concept
of the reasonable consumer to allow expert testimony to inform a
normative judgment on risks and safer alternatives.1 ' A number
of courts, on the other hand, have replaced the CET with other
legal tests based on the reasonableness of the design, such as the
reasonable prudent manufacturer test (PMT) or a risk-utility test
(RUT). 117
In those jurisdictions that use the CET, and a RUT in the al-
ternative, depending on the nature of the case (the two prong test
approach), the CET can be uniformly implemented in the appro-
priate cases as a descriptive test based on what ordinary consum-
ers and users do in fact expect in terms of safety.' States that re-
ly on the CET as a universal test for all design-defect cases have
effectively given the CET a chameleon effect that leads to confu-
sion. Sometimes the CET is treated as a descriptive test and oth-
er times as a normative test depending on the nature of the
case.
119
114. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 n.4 (Cal. 1994).
115. See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).
116. See, e.g., id. at 1336.
117. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Wells, 383 A.2d 640, 642 (Del. 1978) (adopting
the PMT); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (N.J. 1978) (adopting
the RUT).
118. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 307-08 (discussing the objective CET and the interplay
with the risk-utility test); discussion infra Part IV.D.
119. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-703 (Repl. Vol. 2008) (setting forth a subjective
CET), with Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794,
798 (Wis. 1975) (applying an objective CET).
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B. The Risk-Utility and Reasonable Prudent Manufacturer Tests
1. The Risk-Utility Test
The RUT and PMT are the two most prominent legal tests used
by the courts in design-defect litigation. The RUT provides that a
product has a design defect if the risk of danger exceeds the bur-
den to the manufacturer of making the product safer. 2 ° Risk-
utility proof involves two basic types of evidence that are ba-
lanced against each other. The first is proof of the danger in-
volved in the use of the product-the probability that accidents
will happen because of the product design and the gravity of the
harm that will occur if accidents happen.'21 On the other side of
the balance, proof of the proposed alternative design and its fea-
sibility, costs, and implications for the overall utility of the prod-
uct are considered. 12
2
The risk-utility balance in tort law has never been a mere eco-
nomic summing up of the dollars and cents on each side of the
equation. 123 Rather, it is a device that helps decision makers de-
termine if the safety costs are generally worth the preventable
harm.'24 For greater dangers such as grievous bodily harm or loss
of life, utmost precautions should be taken; at slight danger le-
vels, only minimal precautions may be required. 125 Importantly,
the balance is not the risk of harm versus the overall utility of the
product, but rather the much narrower question of whether a
120. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g, Co., 573 P.2d 443,456 (Cal. 1978).
121. Id. at 455.
122. Id.
123. See Oster v. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 582 So.2d 1285, 1289 (La. 1991) (stating that
the court should consider a broad range of social, economic, and moral factors in the risk-
utility balance).
124. See id.
125. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). While
risk-utility proof is the common framework for evidence presentation, a jury's evaluation
is not and should not be restricted to strict economic efficiency. Risk-utility proof can only
be a guide to the social judgment that must be made of whether a product is defective or
not. The variables in the risk-utility balance are not all capable of being converted to a
common denominator necessary to use a formulaic approach. See Green, supra note 113,
at 617. It is not possible for courts, for example, to instruct on the potential severity of
harm or death in terms of dollars and cents or to frame the probability of the harm in
terms of anything approaching a scientifically accurate figure. See id. at 617 & n.39.
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change in a particular design aspect, which would have prevented
the harm, is practicable and cost-effective. 2 '
Risk-utility proof, of course, is the most common basis for es-
tablishing a negligence claim. User safety expectations are prop-
erly includable within the matrix of factors in a negligence analy-
sis, whether expressly spelled out or not. Some courts, and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement
(Third)") expressly indicate that consumer safety expectations are
one of the factors to be considered in strict liability risk-utility
analysis. 1
2 7
The Supreme Court of California, while not giving an exclusive
list of factors in the risk-utility balancing test, said:
[A] jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such
danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse
consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result
from an alternative design.
1 28
As in negligence law, the "other relevant factors" include consum-
er safety expectations and the social and moral justice concerns
integral to personal injury tort law.'29 Both the Restatement
126. See id. at 616-17; PRODUCT LIABILITY: WINNING STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES §§
4.04-4.05 (2008). See generally David G. Owen, Risk-Utility Balancing in Design Defect
Cases, 30 U.MICH. J.L. REFORM 239 (1997) [hereinafter Owen, Risk-Utility].
127. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305, 308 (Cal. 1994); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f(1998).
128. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978).
129. See Oster, 582 So.2d at 1289. The Barker court's suggestion that juries be in-
structed in terms of risk-utility is unfortunate. While the instruction is generally conso-
nant with the proof in a safety adequacy case, it may inform juries that their decisions are
to be governed primarily by economic or efficiency considerations. The risk-utility lan-
guage is substantially mitigated by the Supreme Court of California's requirement that
the defense must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the design did not
contain "excessive preventable danger." See Barker, 573 P.2d at 454. The risk-utility for-
mula is an important guide for trial lawyers in preparing cases and determining discovery
and evidentiary objectives, and it is also helpful to judges in deciding sufficiency of the
evidence motions. But it is not and should not be the only gauge for jury deliberations on
design-defectiveness issues. Like a finding of negligence, a jury determination of design
defectiveness, in the final analysis, is made on the basis of justice standards that are
broader than efficiency alone. An express risk-utility instruction is never used in negli-
gence cases, despite wide acceptance of the Hand formula. Juries in negligence cases are
invariably instructed in terms of reasonable care under the circumstances. Such broad
terminology allows for justice and moral concerns to operate along with efficiency consid-
erations. See Wright, Hand, supra note 75, at 146-53. Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) states that the product must be found to have been in a "defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
1394 [Vol. 43:1373
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
(Second) and the Restatement (Third) use broad language encom-
passing the justice factors, as well as the economics of risk
through the language "unreasonably dangerous" in section
402A 13' and "reasonably safe" in the Restatement (Third).31 The
Supreme Court of California accomplishes this objective through
its reasoning that a product is defective in design if the jury finds
that it embodies an "excessive preventable danger." 132
2. The Reasonable Prudent Manufacturer Test
The PMT, which is used by a significant number of courts, was
developed because of the unworkability of the CET, particularly
in design-defect cases involving safety-adequacy issues that re-
quire a balancing of risk-utility evidence to determine defective-
ness. 33 The PMT also generally relies on risk-utility evidence and
analysis, but frames the jury question in terms of what a reason-
able manufacturer would have done in the circumstances. 34
Many courts opt for the PMT because it seems more appropriate
in cases where the evidence is of a highly technical nature beyond
the experience of ordinary consumers. 13 5 The PMT requires the
trier of fact to determine
whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer or seller of a product
would have produced or marketed that product in the condition that
it was in at the time that the product was placed into the stream of
(1965). The Restatement (Third) also used a broader standard, stating that the product
must be found to be "not reasonably safe." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PRODS. LIAB. § 2
(1998).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
132. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 305, 308; Barker, 573 P.2d at 454. The burden of proof is on
the defendant to show that it is more likely than not that the product does not embody
"excessive preventable danger." See Barker, 573 P.2d. at 455. Unfortunately, this phrase-
ology was not included in the pattern jury instruction developed for California courts. See
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIF. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1204 (2008). Trial judges
should incorporate the "excessive preventable danger" test into their design-defect jury
instructions as a matter of course.
133. See Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown v.
Raymond Corp., 318 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595-96 (W.D. Tenn. 2004); Greene v. Brown & Wil.
liamson Tobacco Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 882, 892-93 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
134. See David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Products Liability: Prudent Manufacturer
Test, 86 A.L.R. 5th 215 § 2[a] (2001).
135. See id. § 4[b].
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commerce, assuming that the manufacturer or seller had knowledge
of the particular risk of injury sustained by the plaintiff.136
In Ray v. BIC Corp., the plaintiff sued for damages on behalf of
her minor son, who suffered serious burn injuries, including brain
damage, while playing with a BIC lighter.137 The plaintiff alleged
that the lighter was defective because it was not child resistant.
138
The federal district court granted summary judgment under the
CET because it found, as a matter of law, that the lighter was not
more dangerous than ordinary consumers would expect. 139 On ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit certified the interpretation of Tennessee's
product liability statute to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.140
The Tennessee court interpreted the statute to allow the plaintiff
to prove a design defect either on the basis of the CET or the
PMT.'41 The court compared the PMT to the RUT, stating:
In effect, the prudent manufacturer test, by definition, requires a
risk-utility analysis. The determination of whether a product is un-
reasonably dangerous turns on whether, balancing all the relevant
factors, a prudent manufacturer would market the product despite
its dangerous condition. Naturally, a prudent manufacturer would
consider usefulness, costs, seriousness and likelihood of potential
harm, and the myriad of other factors often lumped into what plain-
tiff called a risk-utility test. 142
The Tennessee court explained that there are design-defect
cases that fall under the CET and others that are appropriately
governed by the PMT: "[Tihe prudent manufacturer test will of-
ten be the only appropriate means for establishing the unreason-
able dangerousness of a complex product about which an ordinary
consumer has no reasonable expectation."4  Essentially, the court
was differentiating between the safety adequacy cases requiring
risk-utility proof and the alternative proof design-defect cases.
A number of state courts have decided to use a risk-utility
analysis either under a RUT or a PMT in design-defect cases
136. Id. § 2[a].
137. Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 528-29 (Tenn. 1996).
138. Id.
139. See id. at 529.
140. Id. at 529.
141. Id. at 531.
142. Id. at 532.
143. Id. at 531.
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where the ordinary consumer would not know what safety to ex-
pect or how the product could be made safer.1"
The PMT is essentially a negligence standard, but it eliminates
the need to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have
known of the risk in question by presuming that the manufactur-
er knew of the risk. 4 ' In most cases, this distinction means very
little, because, in virtually all cases, it can be easily proved that
the manufacturer in fact did know or, as experts in the field,
should have known of the risk.146 In the cases where foresight of
the risk makes a difference, such as the developmental risk cases,
courts have generally shied away from applying the presump-
tion.14 7 Risk-utility proof is, of course, the workhorse behind the
PMT in the safety adequacy cases. The PMT shifts the focus for
resolving the risk-utility evidence from the ordinary consumer
under the CET to the reasonable manufacturer. 4 ' This shift in fo-
cus is likely of some significance in practice before juries.
Courts using either the RUT or the PMT often speak of the
rules as imposing strict liability despite the virtual overlap with
negligence analysis.'49 This is, to say the least, confusing. Howev-
er, a beneficial side effect of using the rhetoric of strict liability
while essentially employing negligence principles in design-defect
cases has been the willingness of courts and commentators to re-
examine some negligence rules and reform them in the strict
products liability context. 50
144. See Ortho Pharms. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 413-14 (Colo. 1986), modified in
Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 183 (Colo. 1992) (rejecting shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant on the risk-utility evaluation); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool
Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429,
432-33 (Ky. 1980); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982). In Potter,
the court did not adopt the RUT or the PMT, but it did something similar by developing a
CET using risk-utility analysis in certain design-defect cases. Potter, 694 A.2d at 1333.
Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., led the way in establishing that the CET could reflect
both the reasonable consumer and the prudent manufacturer perspectives. 525 P.2d 1033,
1036-37 (Or. 1974).
145. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 839-40 (1973).
146. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[as Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 648 (1980).
147. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
148. Ray, 925 S.W.2d at 530.
149. See Birnbaum, supra note 146, at 601.
150. See id. at 647-49 (giving examples of how courts have adjusted proof and discov-
ery rules in design-defect cases).
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Perhaps the most notable reform is the exclusion of subsequent
remedial redesign measures in strict liability cases. Negligence
law cases uniformly state that remedial repair evidence may not
be introduced to show negligence on the part of the defendant.1"'
Thus, the landlord who repairs the carpet in a common stairway
of his apartment building after a tenant falls need not be con-
cerned that his repair will be used against him if the tenant sues.
Allowing such evidence is anachronistic in the manufacturing
field for a number of reasons. First, the volume of product sales
may actually necessitate re-design to avoid numerous additional
injuries. Moreover, with many consumer products, of which au-
tomobiles are the best example, the re-designs are dictated by
market considerations and competition, and plans for re-design
may be in place long before accidents happen or lawsuits are
filed.
Another change from negligence law is the imposition of liabili-
ty on all sellers in the marketing chain.5 2 Ordinarily, non-
negligent intermediate sellers cannot be liable in negligence be-
cause they have not been negligent. Strict liability recognizes that
sometimes the importer or retailer is the dominant player in the
marketing arrangement and should bear responsibility for unsafe
designs. Recent experience with lead in toys imported by major
American toy manufacturers and sold by major U.S. retailers is a
good example of the need for such liability. 5 '
3. Problems with the Risk-Utility and the Reasonable Prudent
Manufacturer Tests
The RUT works effectively in most design cases, but the impor-
tant question is whether it differs from negligence at all. If not,
the courts are effectively applying negligence principles under a
strict liability flag.
The RUT even when based on negligence principles, is not
without its problems. Some critics contend that it allows lay ju-
ries to second guess design engineers and safety regulations in
151. See Joseph A. Hoffman & George D. Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evi.
dence: Saving the Rule Excluding Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Actions, 22 TORT &
INS. L.J. 497, 498-99 (1986-1987).
152. See Keeton, supra note 34, at 33.
153. See Eric S. Lipton & David Barboza, As More Toys Are Recalled, Trail Ends in
China, N.Y. TIMES June 19, 2007, at Al.
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complex design cases where safety choices must be made.15 4 It is
also said that the RUT allows juries to second guess the market-
place and decide that, even though many people have purchased
the product, it does not have sufficient utility to outweigh the
risks.'55 Additionally, in many states, the design-safety determi-
nation is criticized because juries often lack adequate guidance
for evaluating the risk-utility factors, for example, under a con-
sumer expectations instruction.'56 Most of these criticisms are re-
ally attempts to limit liability.
There is a serious criticism of using risk-utility proof that goes
to the heart of the safety reforms that strict liability pioneers
were striving to achieve. Proving a defect through risk-utility evi-
dence is usually difficult, excessively expensive, and time con-
suming. Consequently, only potentially high-damage-award
products liability cases can be litigated. Most small-recovery
products liability claims are rejected by trial lawyers. The Res-
tatement (Third) probably exacerbated this problem by expressly
requiring proof of a "reasonable alternative design" as a part of
its definition of a design defect.'57 All this, however, essentially
defeats one of the most significant justifications for strict prod-
ucts liability.
Even though the safety adequacy cases require the risk-utility
approach and a return to negligence principles, courts should not
be discouraged from applying strict liability concepts to other cat-
egories of design-defect cases where alternative proof-often less
onerous and less expensive to plaintiffs-can be properly used in
place of risk-utility evidence. We should not treat all design-
defect cases alike in terms of proof requirements. The alternative-
proof categories of design-defect cases are addressed in Part V, in-
fra.
In allowing risk-utility proof and using the RUT or a PMT,
courts distinguish strict products liability from negligence on
154. See Davis, supra note 34, at 1278-80; Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationa-
lizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private
Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 1021-23 (1996) (arguing that "va-
gue risk-utility standards... [have] done little to further any safety").
155. See Amy J. Vroom, Comment, Fast Food or Fat Food: Food Manufacturer Liability
for Obesity, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 56, 57 (2005).
156. See generally Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1700, 1736-40 (2003).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
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three primary grounds: (1) a focus on the product rather than the
producer; (2) use of a hindsight test as contrasted with the fore-
sight approach in negligence; and (3) a shifting of the burden of
proof to the producer on the risk-utility balance. None of these
differences are significant enough to create a meaningful distinc-
tion.
a. Focus on the Product
In distinguishing negligence from strict liability in product ac-
cident cases, many courts have insisted that in strict liability the
focus is on the product rather than the conduct of the manufac-
turer.158 A recent Illinois Supreme Court decision reiterated the
product/conduct distinction, stating that "[iun a negligence defec-
tive design case, the focus is on the conduct of the defendant, but
in a strict liability defective design case, the focus is on the prod-
uct."159 This product/conduct distinction is false. To find the prod-
uct defective based on foresight of the risks and risk-utility anal-
ysis, as most courts do, is to find the design defective and the
design-engineering conduct culpable. A distinguished commenta-
tor cogently criticized the Illinois court's decision and the product
conduct distinction as follows:
The Products Liability Restatement test requiring a "comparison be-
tween an alternative design and the product design that caused the
injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reasonable person," is the
identical test utilized in deciding whether a defendant was negligent.
In both, a fact-finder must determine whether a reasonable person
would find that the product did not meet the reasonableness stan-
dard.... Robots do not make design decisions, human designers do.
Juries sit in judgment on those decisions and do so from an objective
perspective. There simply is no difference between reviewing the
conduct of the manufacturer and the product design. Ultimately,
products are neither reasonable nor unreasonable; they are deemed
so only because a human fact-finder utilizing risk-utility tradeoffs
decides one way or another on the issue.
160
The product/conduct distinction may have arisen in American
products liability law because all sellers, as opposed to the manu-
facturer alone, are held strictly liable for a defective design. In-
termediate sellers typically have nothing to do with the design of
158. See, e.g., Blue v. Envtl. Eng'g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128, 1141 (Ill. 2005).
159. Id.
160. Twerski, supra note 14, at 12 (quoting Blue, 828 N.E.2d at 1141 n.1).
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a product, and in these contexts it is helpful for the legal test to
focus on the product rather than design conduct. Even so, in the
intermediate seller cases, the foreseeability of a risk is evaluated
in terms of the producer's, not the intermediate seller's, reasona-
ble knowledge.161
b. Hindsight of the Risk
A number of courts have attempted to distinguish strict liabili-
ty design cases from negligence cases by declaring that in strict
liability, the risk-utility balance is evaluated in hindsight rather
than foresight. 162 Thus, under the strict liability hindsight ap-
proach, if a risk of harm arising out of foreseeable uses becomes
known by the time of trial, it is conclusively presumed that the
manufacturer had knowledge of the risk at the time of produc-
tion. 63 In light of the imputation of the knowledge and the danger
of the risks, the question is whether there was a cure for that
risk-a safer, feasible alternative-available at the time of pro-
duction that would have prevented the accident. 6" In other
words, this odd construct requires hindsight to be used for the
risk but foresight for a safer design.
This would be a significant difference from negligence at least
in those cases in which the risk was not reasonably knowable at
the time of production but later becomes known. Thus, if the risk
was known by the time of trial, a manufacturer could be liable
even though the risk could not have been known at the time of
marketing.'65 Such a distinction, however, is of no significance in
almost all design-defect cases because manufacturers, through
their design and safety engineers and other personnel, actually
know of the risks presented in normal and foreseeable uses of
their products. Furthermore, manufacturers are held to the stan-
161. See, e.g., Boyl v. California Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 669, 673-74 (D. Or. 1963).
162. See, e.g., Todd v. Societe BIC, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir. 1994); Hornyak v.
Nat'l Presto Indus., No. 94 C 2193, 1995 WL 239104 at *5 (N.D. 1Il. Apr. 20, 1995).
163. See Jack Berman, Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: The
Function of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 93,
99 (1984).
164. See id. at 102-03.
165. Knowledge of scientifically unknowable risks are imputed to the manufacturer at
the time of production, but a later developed safety device to avoid the risks is not imputa-
ble if the state of the art precluded its availability at the time of production. See id. at
102-03.
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dard of experts regarding their products. 6 Thus, in the highly
unlikely event that they were unaware of foreseeable risks, they
will nonetheless be held to have foreseen them because they are
charged with the knowledge that reasonable experts in the field
would have known.
167
Most risks in products accident cases are known from the time
of production because they derive from conscious engineering and
scientific-design choices. Typically, mechanical and engineering
deficiencies are known by the design engineers at the time of pro-
duction if sufficient planning and testing are completed. There-
fore, a hindsight rule would have significance only in a relatively
small number of cases in which the risks could not reasonably
have been known at the time of production. It is principally only
in the pharmaceutical drug, over-the-counter consumable remedy
products industry, and in the chemical industry, that so called
"scientifically unknowable risks" are later detected. 168 New tech-
nologies, such as nanotechnology, may pose such risks if moved
into the marketplace without adequate testing.169 In most in-
stances though, scientifically unknowable risks are very rare.
166. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984).
167. See id.
168. See, id. at 377 (drug side effect allegedly unknown); Green v. Smith & Nephew
AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Wis. 2000) (latex allergy allegedly unknown). Such cases
typically arise with pharmaceutical drug products but have also been experienced in the
asbestos and silicone breast implant cases. See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 550, 555-57 (Cal. 1991) (asbestos case); Rosburg v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (breast implant case). It is questionable
whether the hindsight approach made a difference in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.
There, the plaintiff used two sets of latex gloves per work shift starting in 1978, and this
increased to about forty sets per shift beginning in 1987. Green, 629 N.W. 2d at 732. It was
not until 1989 that she began having health-related problems culminating in very serious
problems in 1991. Id. Reports of latex allergy first appeared in the late 1970s, and the first
deaths were reported in 1989. David S. Shrager & Wayne R. Spivey, Ann. Convention Ref-
erence Materials: Products Liability-Latex Allergy, 2 Ass'n of Trial Law's of Am. ATLA-
CLE 2319 (2000).
169. See Linda K Breggin & Leslie Carothers, Governing Uncertainty: The Nanotech-
nology Environmental, Health, and Safety Challenge, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 285, 287
(2006). Nanotechnology deals with incredibly small particles on the order of 100 nanome-
ters or less (a nanometer comprises one-billionth of a meter). Id. Nanoscale particles are
already included in products such as sunscreens, stain-resistant clothing, textiles, and mi-
crochips. Barnaby J. Feder, New Rules Expected on Safety of Nanotechnology Products,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C10. Critics contend that too little research has been under-
taken to assure the safety of such particles, which may lodge in human organs. Id. Recent-
ly, the DuPont Company and an environmental group, Environmental Defense, issued a
report providing jointly developed guidelines for evaluating the safety of nanotechnology




Where a risk could not reasonably have been foreseen at the
time of marketing-known as a "developmental risk" in European
Union terminology-the application of strict liability would be
considerably different than in negligence law. Whether it would
be appropriate to create a whole new strict liability cause of ac-
tion for all design defects, when only a tiny number diverge from
negligence claims and benefit from the new approach, is a matter
of grave doubt.
Scientifically unknowable or developmental risks do arise occa-
sionally in failure-to-warn cases involving pharmaceutical drugs.
In this context, most U.S. courts require foreseeability when faced
with the hindsight/foresight choice. 7 ° The reality is that, while
courts recite the rhetoric of hindsight, they do not employ the
concept when it counts. When it would make an important differ-
ence-when the risk was unknowable at the time of production-
virtually no courts have been willing to eliminate foresight as a
requirement. 171 Only a few courts have held that foresight of the
risk is not required in strict products liability.172 Thus, most
courts fall back on foresight and forsake hindsight.
It is, of course, anomalous to require a manufacturer to warn
consumers of a risk that was not scientifically knowable at the
time of marketing. Similarly, in the design-defect context a major
conceptual difficulty of the hindsight test is the manufacturer's
duty to develop a safer design for risks unknowable at the time of
manufacture and marketing but later known by the time of trial.
In such situations, the manufacturers arguably never had the
chance to make their products safer. Surely it is incongruous to
impose producer-design-defect liability for risks not reasonably
knowable at the time of production yet at the same time relieve
the producer of such liability if a cure for the risk-a safer de-
170. See Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restate-
ment, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 899-900
(2005). One area of exception has been in asbestos cases where the developmental risk is-
sue was argued forcefully. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539,
542-43 (1982). But even with asbestos, a strong case can be made that the risks associated
with the material were reasonably foreseeable to manufacturers employing the substance.
See id. 542,548-49.
171. See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 555; Brown v. Super. Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal.
1991). Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388-89. See generally Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 898-
909.
172. See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987)
(asbestos risk allegedly unknown); Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1140, 1147
(Mont. 1997) (herbicide exposure risk allegedly unknown); Green, 629 N.W.2d at 737.
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sign-was not readily available at the time of production. To a
large extent, it seems that courts are caught up in the fictional
language of strict products liability without admitting or under-
standing that their handling of these cases is inconsistent with
their language.
173
In another variation on the foresight issue, a few courts have
differentiated strict products liability from negligence by placing
the burden of establishing the absence of reasonable foresight of
the risk at the time of production on the defendant. 7 4 This makes
logical sense in light of the expertise of product producers where
the issue is in dispute. But it is not of much practical consequence
because, in most instances, if a manufacturer plans to produce
expert testimony to show that the risk was unforeseeable, the
plaintiff must in turn invest in the investigation and expertise to
counter this defense testimony.
c. Shifting the Burden of Proof on Risk-Utility
A few courts, with California in the lead, have created a basis
for distinction between strict liability and negligence in design-
defect cases by placing the burden of proof-production and per-
suasion-on the manufacturer. 175 Under this approach, if the
plaintiff can show that some design aspect of the product caused
his injuries, the burden of showing that the product is not defec-
tive is shifted to the defendant. 76 The purpose of this shift is to
mitigate the difficulties in establishing a prima facie case. 77
The allocation of such burden is particularly significant in this con-
text inasmuch as this court's product liability decisions.., have re-
peatedly emphasized that one of the principal purposes behind the
strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of
many of the onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence
cause of action. Because most of the evidentiary matters which may
be relevant to the determination of the adequacy of a product's de-
sign under the "risk-benefit" standard-e.g., the feasibility and cost
173. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 387-88; see also Wertheimer, supra note 170, at 902-03
(discussing the difficulty of laying down bright-line rules in cases that rely on public inter-
est arguments).
174. See, e.g., Feldman, 479 A.2d at 388.
175. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979) (citing Barker
v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978)).
176. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56 (indicating that upon the shift of burden, a design
defect is determined by either CFT or RUT).
177. Id. at 455.
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of alternative designs-are similar to issues typically presented in a
negligent design case and involve technical matters peculiarly with-
in the knowledge of the manufacturer, we conclude that once the
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the injury was proximate-
ly caused by the product's design, the burden should appropriately
shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that
the product is not defective. Moreover, inasmuch as this conclusion
flows from our determination that the fundamental public policies
embraced in Greenman dictate that a manufacturer who seeks to es-
cape liability for an injury proximately caused by its product's design
on a risk-benefit theory should bear the burden of persuading the
trier of fact that its product should not be judged defective, the de-
fendant's burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than
simply the burden of producing evidence.
178
This burden-of-proof procedural distinction at least demon-
strates some difference between negligence and strict liability
claims. As a practical matter, however, plaintiffs do not and can-
not avoid proof of defect. No competent plaintiffs lawyer will
yield the floor on defectiveness to the defendant without first pre-
senting proof of his or her version of the defect and how the de-
sign could have been remedied cost effectively.'79 In modest dam-
age claim cases that cannot justify the expenditures for experts
and discovery, the procedural shift might prove to be helpful. On-
178. Id.
179. See Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L.
REV. 435, 469 (1979). Ordinarily, plaintiffs have a distinct advantage because they go first
with opening arguments and last with closing arguments. See Jansen Voss, Comment, The
Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science Behind the Art of Per-
suasion in the Courtroom, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 301, 311-12 (2005)
Primacy and recency are theories suggesting when to present evidence in tri-
al to gain the greatest possible effect from that evidence. Although experts
disagree on which is most effective, all agree that an argument or piece of
evidence has more of an impact if presented at the beginning or end of a wit-
nesses' examination. The law of primacy in persuasion, formulated by F.H.
Lund, holds that people are influenced most by the information received first.
Lund found that in a debate the first argument presented had the greatest
impact on the audience. Similarly, a jury uses the first arguments and pieces
of evidence to form preliminary opinions about the case. These initial opi-
nions have been found to bias the interpretation of subsequent evidence. In-
consistent evidence, received later, "tends to be disregarded or misinter-
preted" by the jury. Several articles suggest that the most favorable evidence
will have its greatest impact if presented first. Experts have found that "ju-
rors tend to sustain belief in the validity of their initial theories long after
logic suggests those theories have been discredited." The principle of recency
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ly in the rare case where the jury is in equipoise on the defective-
ness question might the burden of proof shift be meaningful.
C. Development of the Restatement (Third) on Products Liability
The continuing difficulties with the implementation of section
402A motivated the ALI to authorize a thorough study of the
products liability field with a view towards adopting a new res-
tatement to bring more coherence into products liability law.'80 In
1998, thirty-four years after section 402A, the ALI adopted the
Restatement (Third).8' It provides that persons in the business of
selling or distributing products are liable if a defective product
causes harm to person or property. 182 Product defects are express-
ly divided into the three categories-manufacturing defects, de-
sign defects, and warning defects-and, for each, different stan-
dards of liability are adopted. 183 Strict liability applies to
manufacturing defects, but the design- and warning-defect sec-
tions reject strict liability principles. 8 4 Instead, they both use
language that evokes a negligence standard without using the
word "negligence."18 5 Design- and warning-defect liability arises
only from foreseeable risks and products that are determined to
be "not reasonably safe.' 81 6 For design defects, the Restatement
(Third) requires risk-utility evidence, and additionally, claimants
must prove that the harm suffered could have been avoided by a
"reasonable alternative design."'87 The factors that may be taken
into account in determining whether or not a product is "reasona-
bly safe" consist of a detailed elaboration of risk-utility considera-
tions. 88 The CET was expressly rejected as a legal test for design
defect, but as a compromise, consumer expectations were in-
cluded as a factor in the risk-utility analysis. 8 9
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. §1 cmt. a (1998); American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products Liability, http://www.ali.org/ali
_old/promo6081.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §1 cmt. a (1998).
182. Id. § 1.
183. See id. § 2.
184. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
185. See id.
186. Id. § 2(b)-(c).
187. See id. § 2(b) & cmt. a.
188. See id. § 2 cmt. a.
189. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
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The comments to the Restatement (Third) explain the "reason-
ably safe" factors as follows:
A broad range of factors may be considered in determining whether
an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission rend-
ers a product not reasonably safe. The factors include, among others,
the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the
instructions and warnings accompanying the product, and the nature
and strength of consumer expectations regarding the product, includ-
ing expectations arising from product portrayal and marketing....
The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as de-
signed and as it alternatively could have been designed may also be
considered. Thus, the likely effects of the alternative design on pro-
duction costs; the effects of the alternative design on product longevi-
ty, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and the range of consumer
choice among products are factors that may be taken into account. A
plaintiff is not necessarily required to introduce proof on all of these
factors; their relevance, and the relevance of other factors, will vary
from case to case.... [Elvidence that a proposed alternative design
would increase production costs may be offset by evidence that prod-
uct portrayal and marketing created substantial expectations of per-
formance or safety, thus increasing the probability of foreseeable
harm. 190
Another comment expressly develops the role of consumer ex-
pectations as a factor:
Such [consumer] expectations are often influenced by how products
are portrayed and marketed and can have a significant impact on
consumer behavior. Thus, although consumer expectations do not
constitute an independent standard for judging the defectiveness of
product designs, they may substantially influence or even be ulti-
mately determinative on risk-utility balancing in judging whether
the omission of a proposed alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe.19 1
The Restatement (Third) was a considerable intellectual effort
in striving for coherence and clarity in products liability law. It
applies strict liability principles for manufacturing and malfunc-
tion design defects and negligence principles for all other design
and warning defects, by requiring risk-utility proof. This struc-
ture largely reflects what courts were doing as products liability
law matured. Yet, the courts tended to use the language of strict
liability even as they required risk-utility proof in the safety ade-
190. Id. § 2 cmt. f (emphasis added).
191. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
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quacy contexts.192 The reasonable-alternative-design requirement
of the Restatement (Third) section 2(b) has been a considerable
stumbling block to the adoption of its design-defect provision. 193
Thus, the plethora of design-defect tests has not been reduced
very much by the new Restatement (Third).194 It is fair to say that
section 402A continues to wield considerable influence in prod-
ucts liability law.
IV. HARMONIZATION AT THE PROOF LEVEL IN DESIGN-
DEFECT CASES
A. Considerable Uniformity at the Proof Level Using Risk-Utility
Proof or Alternative Proof
All of the different design-defect tests-the CET, RUT, PMT,
two-prong tests, and other combinations used by the different
state courts-give the appearance of inordinate confusion in
American products liability law. However, a close examination of
the design-defect cases reveals considerable consensus and har-
monization at the proof level, despite the variation at the design-
defect-test and jury-instruction levels.
Focusing on the proof acceptable to make out a prima facie case
of design defect in strict products liability shows two significant
commonalities in the various courts. The first important commo-
nality at the proof level is that, in virtually all courts across the
United States, risk-utility proof is accepted as a proper method
for proving a design defect, regardless of the legal test or jury in-
struction.195 Indeed, in the safety adequacy cases, it has become
192. See Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 242 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[L]iability for
a design defect may attach even if the defect is apparent [to the consumer]"); Potter v.
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997) ("Furthermore, we em-
phasize that our adoption of a risk-utility balancing component to our consumer expecta-
tion test does not signal a retreat from strict tort liability. In weighing a product's risks
against its utility, the focus of the jury should be on the product itself, and not on the con-
duct of the manufacturer.") (footnotes omitted).
193. See Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331 & n.ll; Jerry J. Phillips, The Unreasonably Unsafe
Product and Strict Liability, 72 TENN. L. REV. 833, 854-55 (2005).
194. See 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9.15 (4th ed. 2001).
See generally Conk, supra note 77, at 800-01, 838-52; J. Denny Shupe & Todd R. Stegger-
da, Toward a More Uniform and "Reasonable" Approach to Products Liability Litigation:
Current Trends in the Adoption of the Restatement (Third) and Its Potential Impact on
Aviation Litigation, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 129, 144-57 (2000).
195. Cf. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Lia-
bility Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1292
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increasingly clear that risk-utility proof is required regardless of
the legal test used.' 96
The second important commonality among the states at the
proof level is that "alternative proof'-proof other than risk-
utility evidence-is allowable in a number of categories of design-
defect accident cases other than the safety adequacy cases.1 97 The
alternative-proof design-defect cases in litigation are considerably
fewer in number, but nonetheless significant. The categories in-
clude: (1) the product malfunction contexts discussed above, (2)
contaminated and unwholesome food cases, (3) safety statute and
regulation violation cases, (4) manifest defect cases, (5) safety re-
presentation cases based on advertising and product promotion,
(6) manufacturer safety performance standard failures, (7) inti-
mate bodily use products, and (8) deviation from industry trade
(1991) (noting that a products' defectiveness is ultimately determined by RUT considera-
tions). See generally David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Prod-
ucts Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 754-55.
196. See Potter 694 A.2d at 1333; McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331-
32 (Or. 2001). See generally 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, § 17:32-34. The Res-
tatement (Third) analyzed all of the design-defect cases existing at the time and divided
them into four categories to show that the predominate approach was to allow or require
risk-utility evidence in design-defect cases. A reporters' note says:
Before turning to the reported decisions themselves, it will be useful to de-
scribe the four general categories into which the cases are grouped. FIRST
are the jurisdictions that explicitly require a plaintiff to whom the important
alternative bases of liability described above are not available to prove that a
reasonable alternative design would have reduced or avoided the plaintiffs
harm. SECOND are the jurisdictions that apply a general risk-utility test for
defective design without explicitly requiring proof of a reasonable alternative
design. Recognition of a risk-utility standard for judging the defectiveness of
product designs implicitly commits the court to the requirement of a reasona-
ble alternative design. THIRD are the jurisdictions that purport to rely on a
consumer expectations test but in fact engage in a risk-utility analysis that,
as with the SECOND approach, implicitly commits the court to a reasonable
alternative design requirement. And FOURTH are the jurisdictions, relative-
ly few in number, that apply a true consumer expectations test, independent
of risk-utility, without requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design.
Taken together, the FIRST, SECOND, and THIRD of these approaches
require, either explicitly or implicitly, the plaintiff to establish the availabili-
ty of a reasonable alternative design in cases not involving product malfunc-
tion, safety standard violation, or egregiously dangerous design. Taken to-
gether, they represent the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions.
Admittedly the FOURTH category of decisions in which consumer expecta-
tions, standing alone, determine defective design does not support the posi-
tion reflected in § 2(b). But the FOURTH approach-reliance on consumer
expectations standing apart from risk-utility-is recognized in only a small
minority of jurisdictions.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB., § 2, reporters' note cmt. (d)(I).
197. See infra Part V.A.
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association safety codes. 9 ' These are elaborated in the following
sections. By identifying and recognizing these categories of de-
sign-defect cases, courts typically allow plaintiffs recourse to less-
burdensome alternative proof to establish a case, and consequent-
ly uphold, at least in part, the consumer protection principles un-
derlying the original products liability reform effort. 199
Types of Design Defects Proof Required or Allowed




of Design Defects (e.g., or
product malfunction in Risk Utility Evidence
normal use)
For the judge, the lawyer, the torts teacher, and the law stu-
dent, this is good news. When evaluating a design-defect case or
problem, regardless of the applicable state law, one of the first
things we can reliably focus on is whether the case involves a
safety adequacy design-defect claim requiring risk-utility proof,
or whether the case fits an alternative-proof category of design
defect. This conclusion on the proof issue will guide investigation,
discovery, proof submission, summary judgment, and directed-
198. See infra Part V.B. The most common situation in which alternative proof is al-
lowed is in product malfunction cases based on circumstantial evidence. Malfunction de-
sign-defect cases typically are those in which a description of the nature of the accident,
the age and condition of the product, and the operator's non-culpable conduct makes it
reasonable for juries to infer that the accident would not have happened unless the prod-
uct was defective. See David G. Owen, Manufacturing Defects, 53 S.C. L. REV. 851, 871-74
(2002).
199. See infra Part.V.A.
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verdict-motion determinations. Thus, one of the most important
considerations in design-defect law is the determination of the di-
viding line or boundary between design-defect cases requiring
risk-utility proof and those allowing alternative proof.00 In effect,
we need to differentiate between the safety adequacy cases re-
quiring risk-utility proof and the other categories of design de-
fects that allow alternative proof.2' Identifying the boundary be-
tween these two types of design-defect cases permits us to
differentiate on the basis of the type of proof required or allowed
and is an important step in harmonizing design-defect law.20 2
B. Analogy of Alternative Proof in Negligence Law
The notion of a dichotomy between risk-utility proof and alter-
native proof to make out a prima facie case is not unique to strict
products liability-it is mirrored in negligence law. It is common-
ly understood that proving negligence involves proving both the
foreseeable risks arising from the defendant's conduct and the
gravity and probability of the harm that might occur. Then the
evidence is contrasted with proof of a safer, feasible, cost-effective
course of conduct the defendant could have undertaken that
would not have unduly interfered with the utility of the activi-
ty.23 Generally, such feasible, safer, and cost-effective conduct
proof is permitted to establish negligence.2"4 Even in negligence
law, however, alternative proof is allowable in certain contexts to
ease the plaintiffs considerable burden of proof.
20 5
Res ipsa loquitur cases are perhaps the best example of alter-
native proof in negligence law.0 6 In some cases, proof of the spe-
200. See 1 OWEN ETAL., supra note 65, at § 8.2.
201. See id.
202. See Donald P. Blydenbaugh, Analyzing Inconsistent Verdicts in Products Liability
Cases, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 46, 55 (2006).
203. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292-93 (1965). Of course, justice factors
play an equal, if not greater role, in determining reasonable conduct beyond efficiency no-
tions. Indeed, courts instruct on the justice oriented reasonable person standard rather
than the economic risk-utility standard. See generally Wright, Hand, supra note 75, at
147-52, 273.
205. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 56 (1982).
206. See, e.g., Bedal v. Hallack & Howard Lumber Co., 226 F.2d 526, 538-39 (9th Cir.
1955); Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300-01 (Exch. Div.).
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cific, negligent conduct and its unreasonableness is unnecessary.
It may be sufficient to establish circumstantial evidence of the
facts of the accident, the likelihood that such accidents do not or-
dinarily occur in the absence of someone's negligence and that, if
anyone was negligent, it was, more likely than not, the defen-
dant. °7 Thus, if ceiling plaster in a hotel falls on a sleeping guest
at night, it is likely sufficient for the guest to prove what hap-
pened and to show the hotel's control over its facilities. The jury
will then be allowed to infer negligence because of the general
knowledge and common expectation that ceilings do not fall in the
absence of negligence.208
Moreover, proof of custom deviation by the defendant is also al-
lowable alternative proof in negligence.20 9 While such custom-
deviation evidence is not necessarily conclusive of negligence, it
may alone be deemed sufficient proof.210 Similarly, in most states
an applicable safety statute or regulation violation is either con-
clusive or persuasive proof of negligence.21' In addition, many
common accidents demonstrate manifest negligence, making spe-
cific proof of alternative conduct unnecessary.2 2 If a plaintiff
proves that the defendant was text messaging at the time his car
swerved into the plaintiffs traffic lane, such proof is undoubtedly
sufficient to establish negligence without more.213 Thus, in negli-
gence, the common use of risk-utility proof lives compatibly with
alternative-proof contexts. These alternative-proof contexts are
important because they often ease a plaintiffs burden of proof in
terms of investigation, the use of experts, and reduction of litiga-
tion costs.
C. The Strict Products Liability Context
Today, it is widely recognized that risk-utility proof is the most
common way of establishing a design defect in strict liability cas-
207. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 154-55 (2000).
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. e, illus. 4 (1965).
209. See Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLuM. L. REV. 1147, 1151-53
(1942).
210. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 65, § 2.7 & n.8.
211. DOBBS, supra note 207, § 134.
212. 18 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 30 (1971).
213. Cf. Robert L. Sachs, Jr., Txt Msgs and Other Driving Distractions, 44 TRIAL 20, 22




es.2"4 Where such proof strongly favoring the plaintiff is available,
plaintiffs readily use it because of its persuasive character. If
plaintiffs can establish a safer, feasible, cost-effective alternative
design that does not unduly interfere with the utility of the prod-
uct, they will typically want to utilize such inherently persuasive
evidence. Additionally, such evidence often tends to show the cul-
pability of the producer, notwithstanding the strict liability label
of the action.21
While risk-utility proof is typically used, it is important to rec-
ognize that it is not required for all design-defect cases. Courts
have implicitly differentiated between the safety adequacy de-
sign-defect cases where risk-utility is required and other catego-
ries of design defects where alternative proof is allowed. The de-
velopment of this proof dichotomy in design-defect cases is best
illustrated by the case law in the states using a two-prong test for
design defect.216 Courts using a two-pronged approach typically
have to develop a boundary between contexts allowing the appli-
cation of the CET and those contexts that require the RUT.21 7
This boundary identifies the proof required or allowable, as well
as the applicable jury instructions.2"' If the RUT is applicable in
safety adequacy cases, then risk-utility proof is required.219 If the
214. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308-09 (Cal. 1994); Potter v. Chica-
go Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997); McCathern v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 (Or. 2001).
215. Generally, plaintiffs are not required to prove an actual alternate design that
works, but they can present proof of a theoretical model through expert testimony. In
some cases where the danger is great and the risk presented by the product is not integral
to the purpose of the product, juries may be allowed to infer that an alternate, safer design
could have been developed. See Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331. The Restatement (Third), on the
other hand, explicitly requires proof of a "reasonable alternative design." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). It is not clear how demanding the standard is
because it is seriously qualified in the comments. Id. § 2 cmt. b, e. Many states that have
considered the issue have rejected the explicit requirement of an alternate design, while a
few have endorsed it. See Annotation, Burden of Proving Feasibility of Alternative Safe
Design in Prods. Liability Action Based on Defective Design, 78 A.L.R. 4th 154, §§ 3-4
(1990).
216. The two-pronged approach was first established in Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573
P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978). Professor Wright counts eleven states that have followed the
two-pronged approach. Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV.
LITIG. 1067, 1080 & n.72 (2007).
217. See Blydenbaugh, supra note 202, at 56.
218. See id. at 55.
219. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 308; DOBBS, supra note 207, § 357.
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CET applies, then alternative proof can be used to establish the
prima facie case.22°
Significantly, the boundary developed in the two-prong ap-
proach turns out to be equally important in all states. Even those
states using a single, universal test for design defect must also
decide on the kinds of proof required to make out a prima facie
case in different product accident contexts and, in doing so, they
differentiate between cases requiring risk-utility proof and cases
allowing alternative proof.22' Thus, a boundary determination re-
lated to the nature of the proof required effectively applies in all
states. To be more explicit, the boundary question-the dividing
line between design-defect cases requiring risk-utility proof and
those allowing alternative proof-is common to all states. In the
two-prong approach, the boundary operates both at the proof and
jury-instruction levels, whereas in states with a single, universal
test for design defect, the boundary question operates only at the
proof level.222
Two significant questions for courts and lawyers arise: When is
risk-utility proof required, and when is alternative proof an al-
lowable substitute? In other words, what is the dividing line that
determines which type of proof can or must be used, and what is
the nature of the allowable alternative proof? The California
courts have developed a general boundary to differentiate be-
tween risk-utility and alternative-proof cases, and the state's
heavy volume of product liability cases has provided the grist for
identifying the different categories of design-defect cases allowing
alternative proof.223 The alternative-proof cases are comprised of
at least eight different categories to date, and the nature of the
alternative proof allowed varies with the category. 224 These cate-
gories, as indicated above, are relevant and helpful to all states,
not just the states using the two-prong approach.
220. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 308.
221. See McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 331 (Or. 2001) (risk-utility
proof not always required in design defect cases); Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
694 A.2d 1319, 1334 (Conn. 1997) (noting that certain contexts require a distinction be-
tween risk-utlity and alternative proof despite adopting a single modified CET).
222. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,457 (Cal. 1978).
223. See Kristine Cordier Karhezis, Annotation, Products Liability: Modern Cases De-
termining Whether Product Is Defectively Desiogned, 96 A.L.R. 3D 22, § 5 (1979).
224. See infra Part V.A-B.
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D. Proof of Design Defect in the States Following the Two-Prong
Approach
The California cases provide an excellent starting point for ex-
amination of the kinds of proof required or allowed to establish a
prima facie case. In 1978, the Supreme Court of California devel-
oped a two-prong legal test for design defect in Barker v. Lull En-
gineering Co.225 Barker involved a piece of heavy construction
equipment called a Lull High-Lift Loader, which was used to lift
loads of up to five thousand pounds to a height of thirty-two
feet.226 The loader was quite large in length and breadth and sat
on four tires that were each about five feet in diameter.22 7 The
loader was designed such that its load could be kept level even if
the loader was on a slope.22 On the day of the accident, the plain-
tiff was operating the loader on sharply sloping ground and was
trying to lift a load some ten to eighteen feet high on the second
story of a building under construction.22 9 As the load was being
lifted it began to tip, and co-workers shouted for the plaintiff to
jump from the loader. 3° The plaintiff jumped, but he was struck
by a piece of falling lumber and seriously injured.23' The plaintiff
contended that the accident was caused by one or more defects in
the loader, whereas the defense argued that the accident was
caused by the plaintiffs inexperience or misuse. 22 The principal
alleged defect was the manufacturer's failure to include outrig-
gers in the design of the loader-mechanical arms with pads at
the ends that could be extended outward from the machine and
placed on the ground to provide stability. 3 The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants.234 The plaintiff appealed on the
ground that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.3 5
Justice Tobriner, writing for the court, reversed and provided
some understanding of the concept of defectiveness in the design
225. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56.







233. Id. at 448.
234. Id. at 449.
235. Id.
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context.2 36 He first acknowledged that design defect is "neither
self-defining nor susceptible to a single definition applicable in all
contexts."2 37 The court concluded that two tests were operative to
establish design defect.238 First, a product could be found to be de-
fective in design "if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner."239
The court, in a later decision, emphasized this basic concept by
stating that the CET is "reserved for cases in which the everyday
experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the
product's design violated minimum safety assumptions ..."'
Secondly, the Barker court asserted that other California cases
had indirectly recognized that a product could be found to have a
defective design if, in hindsight, the jury determines that the
"risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the
benefits of such design. "241 In undertaking the balance of risk and
benefit, the court said that the jury may consider, among other
relevant factors:
the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likeli-
hood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a
safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design,
and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer
that would result from an alternative design.
242
The court distinguished this second design-defect test from a
negligence test in two ways. First, it ruled that, unlike negligence
law's use of foresight, it would apply the strict liability risk-
benefit test with the hindsight of all risks that became known
since the product arrived on the market.243 Second, the court
stated that if the plaintiff establishes that a product's design
proximately caused his injury, then the defendant bears the bur-
236. Id. at 445, 446, 452-53.
237. Id. at 453.
238. Id. at 455-56.
239. Id. at 454.
240. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
241. Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
242. Id. at 455.




den of production and persuasion to establish that, on balance,
the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger.2"
The Barker court summed up its approach to design defects by
stating its two-prong test as follows:
[A] product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff estab-
lishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably fo-
reseeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be found de-
fective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's de-
sign proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the bene-
fits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design.
2 45
Justice Tobriner stated that under the CET standard, "an in-
jured plaintiff will frequently be able to demonstrate the defec-
tiveness of a product by resort to circumstantial evidence, even
when the accident itself precludes identification of the specific de-
fect at fault."246 He cited three cases in which the CET would be
the appropriate legal test.247 Each of the cases involved situations
where vehicles were being operated normally and malfunctions
occurred causing accidents.248 The court found the malfunction
proof in each case sufficient to allow an inference of defect.249
Thus, under Barker, not only were there two different tests for
defect, but concomitantly two different means of proving a defect
depending on the test.250 The court would allow risk-utility evi-
dence under the RUT and alternative proof, as yet undefined, un-
der the CET. 1
Barker brought clarity to the design-defect world, but there
were still many questions to be answered. The risk-utility prong
was easier to implement because it operates similarly to negli-
244. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56 (discussing the public policy behind this shifted bur-
den).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 454.
247. See id. at 454 (citing Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969); Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); Culpepper v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1973)).
248. See Elmore, 451 P.2d at 85; Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 169; Culpepper, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 112.
249. See Elmore, 451 P.2d at 88; Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 170; Culpepper, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 115-16.
250. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-56.
251. See id.
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gence principles, with adjustments for the hindsight and burden-
of-proof-shifting characteristics. The consumer expectations
prong was more problematic. It remained to be determined to
what design-defect contexts the CET applied and the proof re-
quired in such situations. One of the more difficult issues created
by Barker was the geographic domain of each of the tests. Lower
courts were called on to decide when each test applies and wheth-
er both tests can be operative in a single case. In 1982, the Su-
preme Court of California provided some interpretive relief in
Campbell v. General Motors Corp.
252
The plaintiff in Campbell was injured when the bus she was
riding lurched and stopped abruptly causing her to be thrown to
the floor.253 The plaintiff was sitting in the first forward-facing
single seat on the right.254 All such seats had a horizontal metal
"grab bar" at shoulder level attached to their backs. 255 There was
no such bar in front of the plaintiff because her seat faced the side
of a lateral-facing double side seat.25 ' There was a metal armrest
on the side seat, but it was at waist level. 257 Every other seat had
a vertical metal pole connecting the aisle end of the grab bar to
the ceiling. 258 The lateral-facing double seats also had a floor-to-
ceiling pole half-way in front of the seats. 259 No vertical pole was
near the plaintiffs seat.26" The plaintiff testified that as she felt
the bus turn sharply, she reached out for something to hold onto,
but "[there was nothing to grab."26' The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence of a design
defect and lack of causation.262 The Supreme Court of California
first concluded that the plaintiff had introduced enough evidence
to invoke the RUT, shifting the burden of proof to the defen-
dant.2 63 The plaintiffs evidence demonstrated the lack of a stabil-
ity assistance device near her seat and raised a jury question as
252. 649 P.2d 224, 233 (Cal. 1982).









262. Id. at 226-27.
263. See id. at 230, 232.
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to whether the presence of one would have avoided the injuries.264
The court found expert testimony unnecessary in these circums-
tances for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the
risk-utility prong of Barker.265 The burden of proof then shifted to
the defendant to prove that the benefits of the design outweighed
the risks.266
More significantly, Campbell also concluded that the plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case un-
der the consumer expectations prong of Barker.267 The court found
that the use of public buses and the risks associated with sudden
turns and stops were matters of common experience; therefore,
expert testimony was not required.268 Where a product is within
the common experience of ordinary consumers, evidence pre-
sented under the CET is sufficient where a plaintiff shows: "(1)
his or her use of the product; (2) the circumstances surrounding
the injury; and (3) the objective features of the product which are
relevant to an evaluation of its safety."2 69 Campbell established
important guidelines on the requirements to prove a viable CET
case based on a manifest defect in a commonly used product.2"'
The defendant clearly failed to provide a stability assistance de-
vice-a grab bar-for all vulnerable seating.271 The opinion left
open whether the CET could be applied in contexts in which the
use of a product was not within the common experience of ordi-
nary consumers and, if so, the nature of the expert testimony re-
quired in such situations.272
Thus, in the evolving California law on design defect under the
two-prong test, not only are there two different tests for establish-
ing a defect, but also, each test allows for a different means of
proving the defect. Under the RUT, the plaintiff need only prove
that his or her injuries were proximately caused by the product's
design.27 3 The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to in-
264. See id. at 231.
265. See id. at 231-32.
266. See id. at 232.
267. Id. at 232.
268. Id. at 233.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 232-33.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 306 (Cal. 1994).
273. Campbell, 649 P.2d at 228; Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal.
1978).
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troduce risk-utility evidence.27 4 The plaintiff might then rebut
with his or her own evidence on risks and benefits. 275 The defense
carries the burden of persuasion on the balance of risks and bene-
fits. 276 The defense must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the design did not contain "excessive preventable dan-
ger."277 In practice, a plaintiff who wants to rely exclusively or
primarily on the RUT prong of Barker will most likely set forth
his or her view of how and why the accident happened and how it
could have been prevented by a safer, feasible, cost-effective al-
ternative design that does not interfere with the product's under-
lying utility, rather than wait until rebuttal.
Understanding the nature of the alternative proof potentially
allowable under the CET is important to practitioners in develop-
ing trial strategy-particularly on directed verdict motions.
Campbell described alternative proof requirements in the manif-
est design-defect context under the CET and alluded to the prod-
uct malfunction category of cases relying on circumstantial evi-
dence.7 In 1994, the Supreme Court of California returned to the
question of the boundary line between the CET and the RUT in
Soule v. General Motors Corp. and confirmed the general prin-
ciple differentiating the dichotomy.279
Soule involved a collision between two vehicles in which the
force of the accident caused the left front wheel of the plaintiffs
vehicle to break free in a rearward direction, smashing the floor-
board or "toe pan" into her feet and causing severe injuries.28 0 The
parties introduced substantial technical expert testimony on de-
fect and causation.28 ' The plaintiff contended that the weld on a
critical failed bracket was excessively porous and therefore defec-
tive, and that there were alternative designs used by other car
274. Campbell, 649 P.2d at 228; Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
275. See Campbell, 649 P.2d at 230.
276. Campbell, 649 P.2d at 232; Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.
277. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 454-55 (citing Buccery v. Gen. Motors Corp., 132 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 612 (Ct. App. 1976); Self v. Gen. Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578 (Ct. App.
1974); Hyman v. Gordon, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264-65 (Ct. App. 1973)).
278. See Campbell, 649 P.2d at 230-31 (citing McNeil v. Yellow Cab. Co., 147 Cal. Rptr.
733, 734-35 (Ct. App. 1978); Dimond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 134 Cal. Rptr. 895, 902-03
(App. 1976); Lewis v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 798, 805 (Ct. App. 1971)).
279. Cf. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 307-09 (Cal. 1994).
280. Id. at 301.
281. See id. at 302.
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manufacturers that would have prevented the injuries.282 The tri-
al court instructed the jury on each of the two prongs of Barker,
and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.2 3 The defendant
appealed, contending that it was improper to instruct on the CET
in a complex design-defect case.2 4
The Soule court framed the critical issue in the case as whether
"a product's design [may] be found defective on grounds that the
product's performance fell below the safety expectations of the or-
dinary consumer if the question of how safely the product should
have performed cannot be answered by the common experience of
its users [.1"28 The court concluded that performance of the wheel
assembly and toe pan in accidents was outside ordinary consumer
expectations, and thus, the jury should have only considered the
evidence under the RUT.286
The court stated that the CET, as Barker indicated, reflects the
"relationship between strict tort liability.., and the common law
doctrine of warranty, which holds that a product's presence on
the market includes an implied representation 'that it [will] safe-
ly do the jobs for which it was built.' 287 Justice Baxter concluded
that when a design-defect claim calls for a "careful assessment of
feasibility, practicality, risk, and benefit," it must be resolved un-
der the RUT. 28 He relied on Self v. General Motors Corp. as an
example of such a situation.289 Self was a crashworthiness case
regarding the location of an auto gas tank and whether changing
the location to avoid fires and explosions might create even great-
er risks of injury in other commonly occurring situations.29 ° Re-
garding the safety adequacy cases such as Self, the Barker Court
stated that "as a practical matter, in many instances it is simply
impossible to eliminate the balancing or weighing of competing
282. Id.
283. Id. at 303.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 301.
286. Id. at 310. The court concluded, however, that the error in the instructions was
not a prejudicial error warranting a retrial. Id. at 310-11.
287. Id. at 304 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)).
288. Id. at 305.
289. Id. (citing Selfv. Gen. Motors Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1974)).
290. Self, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 577, 580.
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considerations in determining whether a product is defectively
designed or not."
291
For such cases, the Barker court's jury instruction is more ref-
lective of the risk-utility proof required.292
In Soule, Justice Baxter then turned his attention to the scope
of application of the CET.293 Significantly, his opinion reaffirmed
Barker's broad general principle for the proper application of the
CET.294 The Soule court stated that the use of the CET is appro-
priate where the circumstances of the product's failure allow for a
reasonable inference that "the product's design performed below
the legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions
of its ordinary consumers."295
Justice Baxter rejected the defense's contentions that the CET
was incapable of precise definition, focused on the subjective opi-
nions of consumers, and eliminated the careful balancing of risks
and benefits relevant to the design process.296 He stated:
We fully understand the dangers of improper use of the consum-
er expectations test. However, we cannot accept GM's insinuation
that ordinary consumers lack any legitimate expectations about the
minimum safety of the products they use. In particular circums-
tances, a product's design may perform so unsafely that the defect is
apparent to the common reason, experience, and understanding of its
ordinary consumers. In such cases, a lay jury is competent to make
that determination.
29 7
Thus, the CET is the minimum standard for design defects. For
tort law purposes, a product's presence on the market carries an
implied representation that it will safely perform the tasks for
which it was designed. 29 A product is defective in design, at a
minimum, if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer
291. Barker, 573 P.2d at 456.
292. Id. at 455 (asking a jury to consider the "gravity of the danger posed .... the like-
lihood [of] such danger .... the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the
financial cost of [such] an improved design, and [any] adverse consequences ... result[ing
from an alternative design").
293. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 306-08.
294. Id. at 307-08 (noting that the CET "is reserved for cases in which the everyday
experience of the product's users permits a conclusion that the product's design violated
minimum safety assumptions ...
295. Id. at 309.
296. Id. at 309-10.
297. Id. at 310.
298. Id. at 304 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978)).
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would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable
manner. 299 The malfunction and manifest defect-design cases are
two contexts where alternative proof is allowed, in which the Cal-
ifornia courts use the CET jury instruction. °° Importantly, it is
also clearly established that if a product's design passes the min-
imum test of the CET, it may still be found defective under a risk-
utility analysis.0 1
The Supreme Court of California's decisions and the succeeding
intermediate appellate cases have begun to flesh out the contexts
in which the CET is properly operative. The erstwhile distinction
between complex and simple products discussed in some cases
and the legal literature has not worked. Soule's analysis showed
that malfunction cases involving complex products, such as me-
chanical deckboards used on truck loading docks, are properly go-
vernable by the CET.3 °2 While there is an element of truth in the
difference between complex and simple products in many cases,
such phraseology is more misleading than helpful and should be
avoided. In reality, there is no single dividing line between the
CET and the RUT. Consumer product accidents are more likely to
be governed by the CET, but there have been a number of CET
cases outside the consumer product arena requiring risk-utility
proof as well.
E. Relevance of the Two-Prong Proof Boundary to All States
The alternative proof categories developed by California and
other states using the two-prong approach should prove to be re-
levant in all other states. Courts using only the CET as a univer-
sal legal test of design defect have necessarily allowed alternative
methods of proof as well as risk-utility evidence. 3 They have al-
lowed proof of defect by circumstantial evidence in the malfunc-
tion cases from the early days of strict products liability.0 4 Simi-
larly, alternative proof is allowed in manifest defect cases and in
contaminated and unwholesome food contexts to establish design
299. See id. at 303.
300. See Akers v. Kelley Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 524-25 (Ct. App. 1985).
301. See Barker, 573 P.2d, at 454.
302. See Soule, 882 P.2d at 306-07, 310.
303. See, e.g., id. at 308-09.
304. See Barker, 573 P.2d at 454.
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defects where safety statutes are violated. °5 Moreover, those
states that use the RUT or the PMT implicate risk-utility evi-
dence as a matter of course and also recognize the alternative
proof cases. °6 Thus, even though all states, regardless of the na-
ture of the legal test used for design defect, recognize the need for
risk-utility proof in the safety adequacy design cases, they also
recognize that alternative proof categories can be applicable in
other cases.
Oregon recognized the boundary issue between those cases re-
quiring risk-utility proof and those allowing alternative proof us-
ing the CET exclusively in jury instructions as required by legis-
lation.317 In McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., a design-defect
case based on the rollover of an SUV, the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon recognized that, despite the legal test and jury instruction
based on the CET, a safety adequacy design-defect claim may re-
quire risk-utility proof.3"8 The court stated:
[I]n some cases, consumer expectations about how a product should
perform under specific conditions will be within the realm of jurors'
common experience. However, some design-defect cases involve
products or circumstances that are "not so common... that the av-
erage person would know from personal experience what to expect."
When a jury is "unequipped, either by general background or by
facts supplied in the record, to decide whether [a product] failed to
perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have expected,"
this court has recognized that additional evidence ... may consist of
evidence that the magnitude of the product's risk outweighs its utili-
ty, which often is demonstrated by proving that a safer design alter-
native was both practicable and feasible.
30 9
Similarly in Connecticut, the court modified its CET in order to
accommodate the safety adequacy design-defect cases which re-
quire risk-utility proof. The court in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co. framed it this way:
Although today we continue to adhere to our long-standing rule
that a product's defectiveness is to be determined by the expectations
of an ordinary consumer, we nevertheless recognize that there may
305. See infra Part V.B.2, 4, 6, 8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. §§ 3, 4, 7 (1998).
306. See, e.g., Morson v. Super. Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 350-51, 356, 359 (Ct. App.
2001).
307. See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (2007).
308. See 23 P.3d 320, 331-32 (Or. 2001).
309. Id. at 331 (quoting Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 809 (Or. 1967)).
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be instances involving complex product designs in which an ordinary
consumer may not be able to form expectations of safety.... In such
cases, a consumer's expectations may be viewed in light of various
factors that balance the utility of the product's design with the mag-
nitude of its risks. We find persuasive the reasoning of those juris-
dictions that have modified their formulation of the consumer expec-
tation test by incorporating risk-utility factors into the ordinary
consumer expectation analysis .... Thus, the modified consumer ex-
pectation test provides the jury with the product's risks and utility
and then inquires whether a reasonable consumer would consider
the product unreasonably dangerous. 310
These cases illustrate that courts, regardless of the legal test
they use, are recognizing a two-path proof approach in the design-
defect area, resulting in the requirement of risk-utility evidence
in safety adequacy design-defect cases and allowing alternative
proof in other cases.
V. DESIGN-DEFECT CONTEXTS APPROPRIATE FOR
ALTERNATIE PROOF
A. Background
One of the primary reasons for the adoption of strict products
liability was to relieve the plaintiffs difficult burden of proving
negligence by showing that the dangers of the design outweighed
the burden of a safer design. 1 The California courts, in develop-
ing their two-prong approach, have developed categories of prod-
uct accident cases in which risk-utility proof is not essential. 12
Regardless of the test or jury instruction used for design-defect
cases, these alternative proof categories blaze a path for all states
in identifying design-defect contexts in which risk-utility evidence
is not required.
The cases discussed so far illustrate two categories of design-
defect cases that allow for alternative proof to make out a prima
facie case of defectiveness. The multipurpose lathe product mal-
310. 694 A.2d 1319, 1333 (Conn. 1997).
311. See Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 228 (Cal. 1982).
312. Of course, the California Supreme Court went further and shifted the burden of
production and persuasion onto the defendant. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
455 (Cal. 1978). Discussion of a number of unreported California cases have been included
in this study, not primarily for their legal analysis, but for the fact patterns they represent
in categorizing the types of design-defect cases that allow for alternative proof.
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function case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., illu-
strates one category. 13 In such cases, proof is based on circums-
tantial evidence by analogy to res ipsa loquitor in negligence
law. 14 The manifest defect bus stability bar case of Campbell v.
General Motors Corp. illustrates the second category. 1 Campbell
is a case of manifest design defect because ordinary consumers
have common experience with buses, the nature of the risk, and
the availability and need for safety grab bars.1 6
The Restatement (Third) recognizes two major exceptions to the
risk-utility proof requirement for design defects-circumstantial
evidence cases and safety regulation violations-but otherwise
freezes all design-defect cases into the risk-utility proof format.17
There are, however, a number of categories of cases for which al-
ternative proof is properly applicable. At least four different cate-
gories can be deduced from the decisions. Beyond that, logic and
analogies indicate that there are at least four other alternative
proof categories that should be recognized. Isolating the characte-
ristics of these categories will clarify the area and assist the liti-
gating of claims. Most importantly, these alternative proof cases
demonstrate the continuing value of the common law process in
the modern context. The common law of products liability allows
for a way forward-continual adaptation and development consis-
tent with today's circumstances. The next section develops in
more detail the eight existing or evolving categories of design-
defect cases in which alternative proof is or should be allowed.
313. See 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
314. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D (1965).
315. See 649 P.2d 224, 233 (Cal. 1982).
316. Id. at 232-33.
317. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 2 cmt. e, 3, 4 (1998) (provid-
ing exceptions to risk-utility proof for circumstantial evidence cases in section 3, for regu-
latory violations in section 4, and, very indirectly, for manifest defect cases in section 2,
comment e). Food products that are unwholesome or contaminated can utilize alternative




B. Types of Alternative Proof Cases
1. Malfunction Cases-Circumstantial Evidence of Product
Design Defect
It has been well accepted since Byrne v. Boadle that, at times,
descriptions of the circumstances surrounding accidents inferen-
tially demonstrate the negligence of the defendant, without proof
of specific wrongful conduct."' 8 Similarly, it became quickly ac-
cepted that circumstantial evidence could be used to establish an
inference of product defect 19 under strict products liability. 2 ° In
318. See (1863), 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300-01 (Exch. Div.) The translation of "res ipsa lo-
quitur" is "the thing speaks for itself." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D cmt. a
(1965). One wit has said, "If it speaks for itself, why doesn't it speak English?"
319. See, e.g., Adkins v. K-Mart Corp., 511 S.E.2d 840, 847 (W. Va. 1998) (quoting An-
derson v. Chrysler Corp., 403 S.E.2d 189, 194 (W. Va. 1991)); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D (1965); Robert A. Barker, Circumstantial Evidence in Strict
Alternative Proof Contexts
1. Malfunction Cases-Circumstantial Evidence of Product
Design Defect
2. Manifest Design Defects
3. Deviation from Statutory or Regulatory Safety
Standards
4. Deviation from Safety Performance Standards
5. Product Safety Representations and Promotions
6. Food Products
7. Intimate Bodily Use Products
8. Deviation from Industry Wide Safety Codes and
Standards
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actuality, the circumstantial proof approach in strict liability is
simpler than in negligence because it only requires a reasonable
inference of a product defect that existed at the time of sale, whe-
reas negligence cases require not only proof of the defect, but also
proof that the defendant's negligent conduct caused the defect.32'
The circumstantial proof approach is explicitly recognized in
the Restatement (Third) in section 3, which provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was
caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution,
without proof of a specific defect, when the incident that harmed the
plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product
defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes
other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distri-
bution.
32 2
The Barker court, in establishing the CET component of its
two-prong test, recognized that circumstantial proof of defect was
an appropriate way of satisfying the test in some cases:
When a product fails to satisfy... ordinary consumer expectations
as to safety in its intended or reasonably foreseeable operation, a
manufacturer is strictly liable for resulting injuries. Under this
standard, an injured plaintiff will frequently be able to demonstrate
the defectiveness of a product by resort to circumstantial evidence,
even when the accident itself precludes identification of the specific
defect at fault.
323
Akers v. Kelley Co., decided after Barker and cited favorably in
Soule,3 24 described circumstantial proof of defect as a proper cate-
Liability Cases, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 11, 13-14 (1973); J. Gregory Marks, Determining the
Indeterminate Defect, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 237, 239 (2005); Charles H. Cranford, Note, Cir-
cumstantial Evidence and Proof of Defect, 50 N.C. L. REV. 417, 419 (1972); Allan E. Korpe-
la, Annotation, Products Liability: Proof of Defect Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in
Tort, 51 A.L.R. 3D 8 § 2[a] (1973).
320. See Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 87 (Cal. 1969); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 170 (Cal. 1964); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29 (N.Y.
1973).
321. See Adkins, 511 S.E.2d at 846 (quoting Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
253 S.E.2d 666, 677, 680 (W. Va. 1979)).
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
323. Barker v. Lull Engg Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (citations omitted); see also
Elmore, 451 P.2d at 87; Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 170; Culpepper v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1973).
324. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 306-07 (Cal. 1994).
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gory of alternative proof under the CET.325 In Akers, a mechanical
"dockboard" flew apart, severely injuring the loading dock super-
visor.326 A dockboard is a device that connects the loading dock
and the floor of a truck trailer, and adjusts the height between
the two so that a forklift truck carrying goods can be driven back
and forth between the dock and trailer.327 The Court of Appeals
ruled that, based on the plaintiffs proof of the accident's occur-
rence, the jury did not require instruction on the risk-utility test:
There are certain kinds of accidents-even where fairly complex ma-
chinery is involved-which are so bizarre that the average juror,
upon hearing the particulars, might reasonably think: "Whatever the
user may have expected from that contraption, it certainly wasn't
that." Here, a dockboard flew apart and injured Akers. A reasonable
juror with no previous experience of dockboards could conclude that
the dockboard in question failed to meet "consumer expectations" as
to its safety.
328
In Soule, the Supreme Court of California reiterated the cir-
cumstantial evidence rule under the CET:
The crucial question in each individual case is whether the circums-
tances of the product's failure permit an inference that the product's
design performed below the legitimate, commonly accepted mini-
mum safety assumptions of its ordinary consumers.... In particular
circumstances, a product's design may perform so unsafely that the
defect is apparent to the common reason, experience, and under-
standing of its ordinary consumers. In such cases, a lay jury is com-
petent to make that determination.
329
Similarly, in Deleage v. Saab Automobile, A.B., the court ex-
pressly relied on the circumstantial evidence rule in deciding that
the CET was the appropriate jury instruction.330 In Deleage, the
plaintiffs car caught fire while parked in his garage, causing
damage to his house and personal property.33' The facts showed
that the plaintiff had trouble with his four-year-old, employer-
owned Saab, requiring two separate jump-starts.332 That evening,
the plaintiff parked the car in his garage and, upon returning
325. See 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 524 (Ct. App. 1985).
326. Id. at 519.
327. Id. at 517.
328. Id. at 524.
329. Soule, 882 P.2d at 309-10 (footnote omitted).
330. No. A086149, 2002 WL 475268, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2002).
331. Id. at *1.
332. Id.
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from an evening out, found the house destroyed by fire. 33 The
homeowner's insurance company took the burned 1988 Saab, sold
the car for salvage, and destroyed it before it could be ex-
amined.334 Neither side had evidence of an inspection of the
burned vehicle.33 5 The plaintiff introduced reports of wiring de-
fects and dashboard fires in pre-1990 Saabs.3 Plaintiff's expert,
Pello, concluded that the fire in question was caused by the same
defective wire connection alluded to in the reports.3 7 The defense
claimed the fire resulted either from improper jump-starting or
improper installation of a cellular phone.3 ' The court summed up
the evidence in the case as follows:
Evidence showed that Deleage's fire started in his car's dashboard,
that Deleage was experiencing electrical problems with the car on
the day of the fire, and that Deleage and/or his wife detected the
smell of burning electrical wiring coming from the car before leaving
for the opera. Numerous reports concerning pre-1990 Saab 9000s re-
vealed dashboard fires caused by a loose Plus-30 wire or wire chaf-
ing. Of course, this evidence was circumstantial, as was the evidence
relied on by Saab's expert, who reached a conclusion different from
Pello's. Evidence supporting Pello's opinion, however, was sufficient
to support the jury's conclusion that Deleage's injuries were caused
by a design defect.
3 3 9
The court concluded that the CET was the appropriate jury in-
struction, considering the circumstances. 40 The court reasoned
that "[n]o special expertise in car design or electrical circuitry
was needed for a lay person to conclude that a car prone to spon-
taneous combustion falls below commonly accepted expectations
of minimal safety."
341
If a product malfunctions shortly after purchase, a plaintiff
may be able to raise an inference of design or manufacturing de-
fect by the description of the accident itself and by the removal of
third party potential causes. In other cases, expert testimony of a
potential defect may be critical in enabling the plaintiff to sustain
333. Id.
334. Id.









the inference. In Deleage, the car was four years old at the time of
the accident, which raised questions regarding maintenance and
maltreatment by third parties.342 The plaintiff in Deleage over-
came these problems by relying on one expert to demonstrate that
pre-1990 Saabs had dashboard electrical problems and that such
problems were the likely cause of the fire. 43 Similarly, in Akers,
the plaintiff used experts to suggest that the broken welds and
deformations in the thirteen-year-old dockboard were the result
of inadequate design considering the foreseeable circumstances of
use.
3 4 4
In strict liability design-defect litigation, the plaintiff, in rely-
ing on the circumstantial evidence rule, must establish that the
product malfunctioned during normal use and that no one negli-
gently contributed to the accident.345 The age and maintenance of
the product and a comparison with similar products are often re-
levant considerations in such cases. 46
In Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., the Ninth Circuit, in applying
Idaho law, stated:
[A] plaintiff who brings a products liability action may rely upon cir-
cumstantial evidence and the inferences arising therefrom based on
expert opinion testimony on the condition of the product after the ac-
cident. A plaintiff need not prove a specific defect to carry his burden
of proof. He may prove a prima facie case by direct or circumstantial
evidence of a malfunction of the product and the absence of evidence
of abnormal use and the absence of evidence of reasonable secondary
causes which would eliminate liability of the defendant.
3 47
Glanzman involved a tire blowout that resulted in serious inju-
ries.14' The plaintiffs proof was deemed sufficient to allow an in-
ference of product defect where he and others established that he
properly maintained and serviced the tires, did not contribute to
the accident, did not run over any large object, and that the tires
342. See id. at *3, *6.
343. See id. at *3.
344. Akers v. Kelley Co., 219 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Ct. App. 1985).
345. 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, § 17:68.
346. Id. §§ 17:61, 17:64.
347. 892 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Farmer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 553 P.2d
1306, 1311 (Id. 1976)).
348. Id. at 59.
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showed signs of tread separation resulting from the time of man-
ufacture.349
Thus, product malfunction or the unexpected occurrence of an
accident is widely accepted as sufficient evidence of a product
manufacturing or design defect when combined with other cir-
cumstantial evidence establishing the normal use of the product
and the absence of another cause not related to defectiveness.35 °
Risk-utility proof is not required in such cases. 5 1
2. Manifest Design Defects
The manifest design-defect cases are another example of the
use of alternative proof to establish defectiveness in strict liabili-
ty. Where the risk is obviously unreasonable because of common
knowledge of effective ways to reduce the risk, expert testimony
on risk-utility is not necessary.35 2 This common-knowledge ap-
proach of evaluating ways to reduce risks without proof by ex-
perts occurs frequently in negligence law. For example, cases in-
volving inattentiveness to the road while operating a vehicle or
allegations of text messaging while driving do not require proof of
safer alternatives; juries are allowed to reach a decision based on
common knowledge and understanding.
The manifest design-defect category is based on a common-
sense understanding of accident circumstances where it is rea-
sonable to draw an inference of a design defect in the product. In
Soule, the court described the manifest defect category in these
words: "In particular circumstances, a product's design may per-
form so unsafely that the defect is apparent to the common rea-
son, experience, and understanding of its ordinary consumers. In
such cases, a lay jury is competent to make that determina-
tion."3 53
The manifest design-defect category is best illustrated by
Campbell v. General Motors Corp., discussed earlier, involving
the failure to provide a stability grab bar for a bus passenger
349. Id. at 60-61.
350. See Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Product Malfunc-
tion or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 346, 354-63 (1988).
351. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 948 (1997).
352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f(1997).
353. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 310 (Cal. 1994).
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seat. 54 Where the particular product or nature of the accident
falls within the common experience of ordinary consumers, proof
of the accident facts, relevant features of the product, and the
plaintiffs use of the product may be enough to demonstrate a
manifest defect without the invocation of risk-utility proof.55
Thus in Campbell, the plaintiff made out a prima facie case by re-
lying on the public's experience with bus transportation, the need
for stability grab bars, the defendant's provision of stability assis-
tance devices for all the other seats, and the absence of any negli-
gence on the part of the patron.356 Proof of the provision of grab
bars for other seats demonstrated the critical need, feasibility,
and practicality for a safety grab bar for the plaintiffs seat.357
Where the risk that injured the plaintiff is obviously unreasona-
ble, proof related to the balancing of the danger against the bur-
den of redesigning the product is unnecessary.358 Campbell in-
structs that in such manifest defect contexts alternative proof is
sufficient to establish defectiveness if it shows "[the plaintiffs]
use of the product; the circumstances surrounding the injury; and
the objective features of the product which are relevant to an
evaluation of its safety."35 9
A classic early example of a manifest defect in a negligence ac-
tion is presented by Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., in which a custom-
er at an outdoor furniture shop sat in an aluminum rocking
lounge chair.36" As the customer sat in the chair he laid his right
hand on the arm rest, extending one of his fingers over the front
of the arm rest and under its front end.361 Immediately, his "third
finger of his right hand was completely severed by the moving
parts of said chair and the finger fell upon the floor."362 The court
described the chair as
a rocking chair with moving parts; it rocks back and forth. It was
constructed of aluminum and was used for rest and recreation; it
looks harmless, every aspect of it suggested ease and comfort. There
was no notice of any kind that beneath its restful armrest there were
354. See supra Part IV.D.
355. See Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 233 (Cal. 1982).
356. See id. at 231-32.
357. See id. at 231.
358. 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73 at § 17:27.
359. Campbell, 649 P.2d at 233 (numbers omitted).
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moving metal parts so constructed that they would amputate the oc-
cupant's fingers with the ease that one clips a choice flower with
pruning shears. It was designed, constructed and delivered to the
public with these moving parts that were essential to its use. They
were completely concealed from the user and as essential parts of
the chair were inherently dangerous. No one would suspect that
such a dangerous device would be concealed in such an innocent
looking instrumentality.
363
The appellate court found that the plaintiff was entitled to pro-
ceed with his negligent design claim.364
Another manifest design-defect case is Miller v. Mazda Motor
of America, Inc., a case involving the design of a rounded "rear
step bumper" of a pickup truck used for access to the truck bed.36 5
The bumper surface had a downward curvature and was made of
rubber and chrome, instead of all rubber.366 The manufacturer
explained that the bumper was to be used for "step up loading."367
The plaintiff was injured trying to exit the bed of the truck when
her foot slipped on the rounded chrome portion of the bumper.
368
Proof of the Campbell requirements was sufficient to demonstrate
a defective design without introducing risk-utility evidence. 69
In an Oregon case, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a
cylindrical fuel tank on the left side of his tractor.30 After hooking
up the tractor to the trailer of the truck, the plaintiff climbed up
to and stood on the fuel tank to access air and electric hoses,
which he needed to attach to the trailer.3 '1 The plaintiff, and oth-
er drivers using the same kind of truck, customarily approached
the hoses by stepping onto the fuel tank and then onto the deck
plate, an elevated area located in the center of the tractor behind
the cab.372 There was no level step on top of the fuel tank nor ma-
363. Id. at 301.
364. See id.




369. See id. at *3-5. The facts of these unreported California appellate cases are impor-
tant for categorizing the kinds of design-defect cases that have arisen since Barker was
decided, and for isolating the types of cases in which the CET was considered appropriate
from those cases requiring the RUT.





terial on the fuel tank to prevent slipping.373 This evidence was
held sufficient to raise a jury question of defectiveness. 4 There
was a question of fact whether the product was manifestly defec-
tive because of the failure to include skid-proof material on the
deck plate as a part of the design of the fuel tank. 5
In a New Jersey case, the plaintiff, an assistant manager of a
convenience store, slipped and lost his balance while walking to
empty a trash can.37" As he reached out to steady himself, his
right hand contacted the unattended and unguarded rotating
blade of a slicing machine. 7 The safety guard had been removed
from the slicer either for cleaning or to sharpen the blade. 378 The
plaintiffs expert testified that there were safety devices readily
available, such as interlock devices, that would prevent such a
machine from operating when the guard was removed.379 The
court concluded that the use of the CET in instructing the jury
was appropriate:
The design of a product is "self-evidently" defective when there are
no relevant considerations which make the hazard inherent in the
product or reasonably necessary to its functioning. With respect to
such a product, the risk-utility balancing test is unnecessary. The
only material question is whether the product has been designed so
as to pose a hazard that is contrary to the user's reasonable expecta-
tions. In the present case, the evidence did not suggest any consider-
ation of feasibility, cost or functionality which might tend to justify
the omission of a blade guard interlock. The only relevant question
left for the jury was whether the Globe Model 500 slicing machine
was so hazardous that it was contrary to a user's reasonable expec-
tations.
38 0
The Restatement (Third) obliquely recognizes that there are
situations of manifest defect where proof of an alternate safer de-
sign is not required, but it does so in a fashion that disparages
and discourages the use of the category.38 The comments in the
Restatement (Third) restrict a manifestly defective design to those
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1379.
375. See id.




379. See id. at 1121.
380. Id. at 1123.
381. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmt. e (1998).
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products that should be completely removed from the market.382
The only example explicitly given in the Restatement (Third)
comments is a toy hard pellet gun.3"' The comments imply that if
a safer, alternative design is available, it must be proven.3' The
products the Restatement (Third) has in mind are products that-
after a thorough risk-utility analysis-should be banned as a
matter of law because of their exceptionally high danger, the ina-
bility of eliminating their risks, and their very low utility.35 The
category as described by the Restatement (Third) is effectively
meaningless because courts are naturally very reluctant to find
that products are so dangerous and have so little utility that they
should not be marketed at all. Only in the case of toys might
courts conceivably do so.
The Restatement (Third) ignores the caselaw and the logic re-
garding the alternative proof category of manifest defects; it fails
to acknowledge that the absence of a commonly available safety
device known to the general public, or a totally unexpected dan-
ger in a common consumer item, can make an otherwise useful
product manifestly defective without the need of experts.8 6 Such
a conclusion does not necessarily require banning the product,
but rather eliminating the risk by an easy redesign.
It can be argued, of course, that the three proof elements estab-
lished by the Campbell case essentially constitute inferential
risk-utility proof, but no examples of such cases are provided in
the comments or reporters' notes to guide the courts in under-
standing the breadth of the manifest design-defect-alternative
proof category as developed in this article.8 7 The Restatement
(Third) effectively overlooks the alternative-proof category of ma-
nifest defects.
There can be some overlap between the malfunction and the
manifest defect categories, but they are more commonly indepen-
382. See id. at cmts. d, e.
383. See id. at cmt. e.
384. See id. at cmt. d.
385. But see Michael J. Tdke, Categorical Liability for Manifestly Unreasonable De-
signs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the Restatement (Third), 81
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1201 (1996) (arguing against comment d's exception to the re-
quirement that plaintiffs must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have re-
duced their foreseeable risk of injury).
386. See RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e. (1998).
387. See id. at cmt. e, reporters' notes.
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dent of each other. The manifest defect category clearly impli-
cates a design defect while the malfunction category can often be
either a design or a manufacturing defect. Moreover, in the ma-
nifest design-defect cases, the plaintiff can usually identify the
defect, invoking common experience and common sense to dem-
onstrate that there are feasible and practicable cost-effective
ways to design the product to avoid risks, without the need for
expert testimony. In addition, it is often very awkward to charac-
terize and understand the manifest defect cases as product mal-
function cases.
3. Deviation from Statutory or Regulatory Safety Standards
Proof of a statutory or regulatory product-design safety re-
quirement constitutes a third category of a product-design-defect
case that does not require risk-utility proof. This is familiar doc-
trine from negligence law.388 Proof of a violation of a relevant
safety statute and a causal relation between the violation and the
injury is usually sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence. 38 9 The procedural effect of such violations-per se negli-
gence, presumption of negligence, or evidence of negligence-may
vary from state to state, but proof of the violation is often enough
to show a breach of duty.39 ° This is also true for establishing de-
fectiveness in product accident cases under strict liability.391
In strict products liability, proof of a relevant safety regulation
violation and its causal linkage to the injury is enough to estab-
lish a product's deficiency.392 The Restatement (Third) adopted an
express rule to this effect that states:
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate in-
structions or warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety sta-
tute or administrative regulation renders the product defective with
respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation;
and
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute
or administrative regulation is properly considered in determining
388. See DOBBS, supra note 207, § 134.
389. See id. § 134 & n.5.
390. See id. § 134.
391. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (1998).
392. See id.; see also id. § 15 (noting that causation is governed by standard tort prin-
ciples).
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whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to
be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance does
not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.
393
A "relevant" product safety regulation is one that seeks to elim-
inate or reduce the type of risks that caused the plaintiffs inju-
ries and was in effect prior to the marketing of the product in
question. 39
Although all states will undoubtedly allow relevant design
safety regulation violations as proof of design defects under strict
liability, there have been very few such appellate cases. 395 The
few product design regulation violation cases that have reached
the appellate courts have typically been based on negligence
claims.39" Recognizing "regulatory design defectiveness" is emi-
nently consistent with the reform objectives of strict products lia-
bility. The law and consumers expect manufacturers to design
products in accordance with safety regulations. The absence of
case law may indicate a high level of compliance with design safe-
ty regulations, or, more importantly, a strong likelihood that reg-
ulatory violation cases are settled without trial. 9 v
While states allow for some excuses for regulatory violations in
negligence cases such as emergencies, impossibility of com-
pliance, and situations where it is more dangerous to comply,398
there are no readily apparent occasions for invoking excuses re-
garding violations of design regulations. Since manufacturers are
charged with knowledge of design regulation requirements, 99 the
occasions for justifiable excuses are narrowed, if not eliminated.
Thus, violations of design-safety statutes and regulations are
an additional category of alternative proof in design-defect litiga-
tion. Proof of the regulation violation is sufficient to establish a
393. Id. § 4.
394. Id. at cmts. b & c.
395. See Mikolajcyzk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ill. 2008) (quoting Ander-
son v. Hyster Co., 385 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (111.1979)); Robles v. Shoreside Petroleum,
Inc., 29 P.3d 838, 843-44 (Alaska 2001); Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 10 (Alaska
1983); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (Ct. App. 1983).
396. See Robles, 29 P.3d at 840; Harned, 665 P.2d at 10-11; McGee, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
542-46.
397. See 4B Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d § 57:1 (West) (rev. Nov. 2007) (discussing high like-
lihood of products liability cases settling before trial).
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
399. See Bachner v. Rich, 554 P.2d 430, 436-37 (Alaska 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4, reporter's note, cmt. d.
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prima facie case of design defect without introducing any risk-
utility evidence.4 °°
4. Deviation from Safety Performance Standards
Safety components designed into products to reduce risks
should be expected to operate within their design specifications.
Where a product in normal use fails to operate within the manu-
facturer's own established safety performance specifications and
causes harm, proof of such failure alone should be sufficient un-
der an alternative-proof standard to establish the defectiveness of
the product. This safety performance category is closely analog-
ous to manufacturing defects. 40 1 The legal test for manufacturing
defects is whether the product failed to meet the manufacturer's
own design specifications. 4 2 There is no reason to distinguish be-
tween product physical design specifications and product safety
performance specifications; they are both design specifications.
The California decision in McCabe v. American Honda Motor
Co. illustrates this category in a setting where a car's safety de-
vice failed to operate.40 3 In McCabe, the plaintiff was injured
when the driver's side air bag in her Honda Civic did not deploy
in a frontal collision with another car.40 4 The plaintiff filed a strict
liability design-defect claim against the manufacturer, relying on
proof that the air bag did not deploy within the manufacturer's
own performance specifications .405 Defense expert testimony
proved that the side air bag was designed to deploy when one or
more vehicles in a collision are traveling at or above twelve miles
per hour and the frontal collision range is within thirty degrees of
the centerline of the vehicle. 40 ' The plaintiff and her witnesses
testified that the car that collided with her stopped vehicle was
traveling at a "high speed" in excess of thirty-five miles per hour
400. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (1998).
401. See id. § 2.
402. See id. cmt. d.
403. 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 303, 307 (Ct. App. 2002).
404. Id.
405. See id. at 313.
406. Id.
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and that the collision was "head on."407 The plaintiff had photo-
graphs showing extensive front end damage.08
The reconstruction expert for the defense testified that the
speed of the oncoming car was about four miles per hour and the
point of impact was at thirty-five degrees of the centerline. °9 The
defense also asserted that designing the air bag deployment pa-
rameters is a very technical process requiring the balancing of
competing safety considerations, and it relied on an earlier Cali-
fornia case requiring risk-utility proof in an air bag case.41 The
defense pointed out that airbags themselves can cause injuries,
and such injuries must be balanced against the potential injuries
from low speed collisions in deciding the point at which the air-
bags should deploy. 1'
The court concluded that the evidence introduced by the plain-
tiff was sufficient to raise a jury question of defectiveness because
it was for the jury to determine whether the collision occurred
within the design parameters for deployment or not. 2 If the col-
lision was within the design parameters, the airbag should have
deployed and the plaintiffs collision injuries would have been
avoided.4 13 The court held that it was up to the jury to determine
which version of the accident facts was more probable. 4  Thus,
proof of the safety performance specification parameters, coupled
with evidence of the accident occurring within those parameters,
was enough to raise a jury question of design defect without the
introduction of risk-utility proof.4 15 The safety performance stan-
dard category of design-defect cases is related to the next catego-
ry involving manufacturer safety representations.
407. Id. at 307-08.
408. Id. at 308.
409. Id.
410. See id. at 308, 312 (quoting Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 6 (Ct.
App. 1999)). There was a division of authority in California courts over whether ordinary
consumers could have minimum safety expectations regarding air bags. Compare Pruitt,
86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 6 (deployment in a low speed collision is not part of everyday expe-
rience of the consuming public), with Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804,
808 (Ct. App. 1998) (minor rear end collision provided a basis for applying the consumer
expectations test).
411. See McCabe, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
412. See id. at 313-14.
413. See id. at 314.
414. See id.
415. Id. at 313-14.
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5. Product Safety Representations and Promotions
Product advertising and all other forms of promotion, of course,
create impressions about the uses and safety of products. They
are a dominant feature of the marketplace. Where product pro-
motion constitutes representations of safety that are relevant to
an accident in question, proof of these promotional representa-
tions is generally admissible in establishing defectiveness in
strict liability.4 16 Just as manufacturers are expected to meet
their own design specifications in product production, they should
similarly be held to their own representations of safety. While it
may be difficult in some cases to determine whether advertising
amounts to a safety representation, the principle of representa-
tion liability is nonetheless an important one to uphold in appro-
priate cases. Courts can and should exercise considerable control
over what constitutes actionable safety representations, but, in
clear cases, proof of the failure of the product to perform safely in
accordance with the producer's own safety promotions should
alone be sufficient to establish defectiveness of the product. 17
The early case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., in
418which strict products liability was born, involved a product-
the Shopsmith-that failed to measure up to the manufacturer's
promotional safety statements about it. 419 The manufacturer's
product brochure read: "(1) 'WHEN SHOPSMITH IS IN HORI-
ZONTAL POSITION-Rugged construction of frame provides ri-
gid support from end to end. Heavy centerless-ground steel tub-
ing insurers [sic] perfect alignment of components.' (2) 'SHOP-
SMITH maintains its accuracy because every component has pos-
itive locks that hold adjustments through rough or precision
work."'42° These statements were introduced as proof in strict tort
416. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Products Liability: Statements in Adver-
tisements as Affecting Liability of Manufacturers or Sellers for Injury Caused by Product
Other than Tobacco, 93 A.L.R. 5TH 103, § 23[a] (2001).
417. Cf. Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the
Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 240-41
(1997) (explaining that if producers are not liable for false safety promotions, a "consumer
losels] both the benefit of his or her bargin and his or her bargaining autonomy").
418. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 530 (1997).
419. 377 P.2d 897,898 (Cal. 1963).
420. Id. at 899 n..
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liability that the Shopsmith was unsafe for its intended use and
could have been found to constitute express warranties.42'
In virtually all of the cases to date, safety advertising proof has
been supplemental to risk-utility proof in establishing a design
defect. This may be the result of attorney hesitance to rely solely
on advertising proof when risk-utility proof is also available.
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., involved a "pitchover" of a
Jeep all-terrain vehicle as it came over the brow of a steep hill at
an off-road recreational facility, resulting in injuries to the plain-
tiffs.4 22 The case was premised on the design inadequacy of the
provided roll bar.42' The plaintiff was allowed to introduce proof of
an advertising campaign and television commercials, both of
which stressed the ability of the Jeep to safely drive up and down
steep hills. 4
Similarly, in McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp. 42-an SUV rol-
lover case-the plaintiff relied on television and brochure adver-
tising to show that the vehicle was specifically marketed as one
that could engage in evasive maneuvers during highway driving.
In Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., the plaintiff-homeowners
were able to proceed under the CET where the manufacturer's la-
bels, manuals, and advertisements contained misstatements that
its insecticide was lethal to termites but harmless to humans.426
The manufacturer in Miller v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., dis-
cussed earlier, advertised the bumper, on which the plaintiff
slipped, as being for "step-up loading." 427 Where a relatively new
tire, driven less than two thousand miles, suddenly deflated and
caught fire, a Pennsylvania court acknowledged that "[pirospec-
tive purchasers are the objects of sustained and vigorous adver-
tising campaigns extolling the toughness of automobile tires,
their reliability and dependability[ ]" and that "[c]ommon exper-
421. Id. at 899.
422. 424 N.E.2d 568, 571 (Ohio 1981) (defining "pitchover" as the movement of a ve-
hicle's rear that passes through the air in a 180 degree arc causing the vehicle to land up-
side down).
423. See id. at 571-72.
424. Id. at 579-80.
425. 23 P.2d 320, 324 (Or. 2001).
426. 804 F. Supp. 972, 979-80 (S.D. Ohio 1992), affd on other grounds, 24 F.3d 809,
814 (6th Cir. 1994).
427. Miller v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., Nos. B142181, B143856, 2002 WL 819856, at
*1 (Ct. App. May 1, 2002).
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ience indicates that no owner of a tire expects it to fail with less
than [two thousand] miles on its treads."428
In design-defect cases with incapacitating injuries, plaintiffs'
lawyers will certainly want to go beyond advertising proof and re-
ly on risk-utility evidence if they can. Using advertising and pro-
motional materials related to safety as supplemental evidence is
a common practice. 429 There are cases, however, where the poten-
tial recoverable damages are insufficient to justify the expense of
investigation and the use of experts to show a safer, feasible, al-
ternative design.43 ° In such cases, if there is clear proof that the
product did not perform safely in accordance with the promotion-
al representations, the plaintiffs should be able to proceed on the
basis of the representations alone. Relieving the victims of bur-
densome proof requirements was a primary purpose of strict
products liability,43' and it is appropriate to use proof of clear ad-
vertising safety representations where the manufacturer sets a
safety expectation and then fails to meet it. 4
3 2
6. Food Products
Unwholesome food has always received special consideration in
the law. Warranty law provides consumers with considerable pro-
tection from the sale and distribution of contaminated and un-
wholesome food.433 There is an implied warranty of wholesome-
ness and fitness for human consumption in the sale of food
products.4 4 Persons who are injured by eating unwholesome food
or food containing deleterious substances can sue sellers or serv-
ers for the breach of that implied warranty.4 5 Sellers and servers
of unwholesome food are liable despite the exercise of all possible
428. McCann v. Atlas Supply Co., 325 F. Supp. 701, 704 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
429. See supra notes 419-28 and accompanying text.
430. See Aaron Arnold, Note, Rethinking De8ign Defect Law: Should Arizona Adopt the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 190-91 (2003).
431. See id. at 190.
432. The injured person should not have to prove specific reliance on the advertising in
order to recover. See King v. Kayak Mfg. Corp., 387 S.E.2d 511, 522 (W. Va. 1989). Where
sellers have created the impression of safety through promotional efforts, it is inconsistent
with the consumer protection goals of strict products liability for courts to impose an ac-
tual reliance requirement. See id.
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care in handling and preparing the food.43' The plaintiff need only
prove the defective condition of the food and the causal relation-
ship to his or her illness.43 v Therefore, sellers and servers are held
strickly liable for injuries caused by the distribution of unwhole-
some food.438
There also are many state and federal statutes, regulations,
and municipal ordinances regulating the wholesomeness of food,
and violation of these provisions is generally considered negli-
gence per se.439 This is a form of strict liability operating within
negligence law. Products in violation of such safety statutes
should also be recognized as "defective per se" under strict prod-
ucts liability. 4 1
The strict liability implications of the unwholesome food cases
influenced Dean Prosser's scholarship and Justice Traynor's opi-
nions in Escola and Greenman.441 As Dean Prosser stated:
Since the early days of the common law those engaged in the busi-
ness of selling food intended for human consumption have been held
to a high degree of responsibility for their products. As long ago as
1266 there were enacted special criminal statutes imposing penalties
upon victualers, vintners, brewers, butchers, cooks, and other per-
sons who supplied "corrupt" food and drink. In the earlier part of
this century this ancient attitude was reflected in a series of deci-
sions in which the courts of a number of states sought to find some
method of holding the seller of food liable to the ultimate consumer
even though there was no showing of negligence on the part of the
seller.
4 4 2
A plaintiff injured by unwholesome food who asserts a tort
claim based on strict products liability law must prove the same
elements required in the implied warranty context. The plaintiff
need merely prove the sale of the food, its unwholesome or con-
taminated character, and its relationship to the plaintiffs ill-
436. See id.
437. See id.
438. See id. § 81:3.
439. Id. § 81:7.
440. See supra Part V.B.3.
441. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442-43 (Cal. 1944). See generally Prosser,
supra note 70, at 1103-10 (describing the development and application of strict liability to
food products).
442. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. b (1965).
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ness.43 Many of the unwholesome food cases of necessity rely on
circumstantial evidence.' Generally, a plaintiff need only ex-
clude all other reasonable causes of the illness and introduce suf-
ficient facts to make reasonably probable the conclusion that the
food in question was unwholesome and caused the plaintiffs ill-
ness.4
5
Since a safer, feasible alternative in the form of wholesome food
is legally presumed, the plaintiff need not introduce risk-utility
proof."6 The Restatement (Third) expressly adopts this approach:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
food products who sells or distributes a food product that is defective
under § 2 [manufacturing, design and warning defects], § 3 [circums-
tantial evidence of defect], or § 4 [violation of statute establishing de-
fect] is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by
the defect. Under § 2(a) [manufacturing defect], a harm-causing in-
gredient of the food product constitutes a defect if a reasonable con-
sumer would not expect the food product to contain that ingre-
dient.
4 4 7
The Restatement (Third), therefore, recognizes that proving a de-
fective food product claim can be based on alternative proof ra-
ther than on risk-utility evidence.448
It is also significant to note that in the context of contaminated
food, the Restatement (Third) chose to utilize the consumer expec-
tations test.449 A number of states instead distinguish between
substances naturally found in food (i.e., bones in fresh chicken
soup) and foreign substances (i.e., stones in chicken soup).450 This
has proven to be troublesome in prepared food contexts, such as
chicken salad, and processed foods, such as canned chicken
soup.451 Because of this, courts tend to use a reasonable expecta-
tion test that focuses on whether consumers ought to anticipate
the presence of the troublesome substance in the food. 412 The food
443. See 5 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d supra note 433, §§ 81:2, 81:3.
444. See id. § 81.
445. See id.
446. See id. § 81:2.
447. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 7 (1998).
448. See id.
449. See id.
450. See id. § 7 cmt. b; 5 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 433; § 80:5.
451. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 7 cmnt. b (1998).
452. See id.; 5 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 433, § 80:5.
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cases demonstrate another alternative proof category in strict
products liability.
7. Intimate Bodily Use Products
Intimate bodily use products include those personal care prod-
ucts we apply or take into our body for health or cosmetic reasons
such as skin creams, lotions, salves, deodorants, perfumes, sham-
poos, hair preparations, tampons, sanitary pads, and douches.453
These types of products, like food products, demand the highest
standards of design and preparation because of the potential for
harm.454 Here too, warranty law gradually became quite protec-
tive of consumers by imposing strict liability if such products fo-
reseeably could cause harm in the absence of warnings (hereinaf-
ter the "warning-defect approach").455 Dean Prosser, as the Re-
porter for section 402A the Restatement (Second), cited the war-
ranty law treatment of intimate bodily use products as supportive
of strict liability in torts.45 6 He noted that the principles from
strict liability food cases were first extended "into the closely ana-
logous cases of other products intended for intimate bodily use,
where, for example, as in the case of cosmetics, the application to
the body of the consumer is external rather than internal."4 7
Dean Prosser spoke to the situation of allergic reactions as fol-
lows:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous,
the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the con-
tainer, as to its use. The seller may reasonably assume that those
with common allergies, as for example to eggs or strawberries, will
be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against them.
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a sub-
stantial number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is
one whose danger is not generally known, or if known is one which
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the product, the
seller is required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, or
by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and fore
453. See 6 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d (West) § 86-1 (rev. Aug. 2003).
454. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A crnt. b.
455. See 6 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 453, §§ 86:1-86:2.
456. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (1965).
457. Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 42, at 1111-12.
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sight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and
the danger.
458
Advertising asserting that a personal care product is safe, mild,
gentle, or harmless can also lead to warranty liability if the prod-
uct causes injury in normal use.459 In warranty and negligence
law, the courts developed a rule that for such product defects to
be actionable, the risks of harm must be foreseeable to an appre-
ciable or substantial number of persons or class of persons using
the products. 4 ° This limitation was created so that highly useful
products would not bear liability if only a few persons with idio-
syncratic allergic reactions were affected.461 On one hand, when
serious allergic reactions from personal care products affected on-
ly a tiny number of the user community (for example, three in
225,000,000, or four in 7,000,000, or four in 600,000) the courts
have not imposed liability.462 On the other hand, 373 complaints
out of 82 million users, and, in another case in which five to se-
venteen percent of users complained of injury, courts held these
small numbers sufficient to create a jury question on the substan-
tiality issue.463 Most of the appellate cases in this area involve
458. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A cmt. j (emphasis added).
459. See 6 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 453, § 86:1.
460. See id. § 86.5.
461. See id.
462. Id. § 86:5 & n.32 (citing Mountain v. Procter & Gamble Co., 312 F. Supp. 534, 535
(E.D. Wis. 1970); Booker v. Revlon Realistic Prof'l Prods., Inc., 443 So.2d 407, 409 (La. Ct.
App. 1983); Kaempfe v. Lehn & Fink Prods. Corp., 249 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843-44 (1964)).
463. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Wis. 2001); see Wright
v. Carter Prods., Inc. 244 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1957). One commentator has described the
allergy analysis as follows:
The conclusion that a manufacturer "should have known" of the allergenic
nature of its product is based on the plaintiffs showing that at the time of in-
jury the plaintiff was a member of a substantial, significant, or appreciable
class of individuals who were or could have been harmed by the allergenic
nature of the product.
There is no set number of people that the plaintiff must show to have suf-
fered a reaction. Most courts play what is described as a numbers game in de-
termining whether a plaintiff was a member of an appreciable class. The
greater the likelihood of an allergic reaction following the use of the manufac-
turer's product, the more likely a duty to warn will be imposed on the manu-
facturer. However, as ambiguous as the requisite number appears to be, it is
clear that it must be more than merely a few.
For example, in Wright v. Carter Products, the lower court held that, be-
cause only a minuscule percentage of the potential customers would be in
danger using the product, it did not warrant finding that the manufacturer
had no duty to warn of the harmful effects of which the manufacturer had
knowledge. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held to the contrary. The court remanded the case to determine (1)
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claims of failure to warn rather than design defect, even though
the products also may have been unsafely designed.4
The courts in California have a mixed record in applying strict
liability to the intimate bodily use product design-defect cases. In
Soule, the Supreme Court of California cited favorably a lower
court's application of the CET to a vaginal tampon design-defect
case."' In West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., the plaintiff
contracted toxic shock syndrome while using the defendant's
tampon.4 6 At the time of West, the "exact molecular mechanism"
as to how the tampons contributed to toxic shock syndrome had
not been established by any scientific study, but the plaintiffs ex-
perts pointed to alleged design defects in the tampon and gave
opinions that there was a causal connection. 467 The court con-
cluded that where the product had been distributed nationally for
three years and the plaintiff had been using the tampons for close
to five years, a jury could reasonably infer that ordinary users of
the tampon "had every right to expect, that use of the product
would not lead to a serious (or perhaps fatal) illness."46 8 The court
ruled that the plaintiffs satisfaction of the proof requirements es-
tablished by the Campbell case and expert proof on causation
whether, in the exercise of reasonable precaution, the defendant could have
foreseen that at least some of the potential users of their deodorant would
suffer serious injury from the use of that product and (2) whether the defen-
dant had a duty to warn.
Michael K. Barrett, Latex Gloves: Medical-Legal Issues for Health Care Professionals, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 263, 270-71 (2001).
A plaintiff should only have to prove the normal use of the product in accordance with
instructions and warnings and the resulting harm caused by the product. Because of the
virtual impossibility and expense in requiring the consumer to introduce survey data
showing a substantial number of people adversely affected by a personal care product, the
burden of proof (production and persuasion) should be placed on the defendant-
manufacturer as an expert in the business to show that the product does not cause harm
to a substantial number of users. The ubiquitousness of the patch tests accompanying per-
sonal care products today demonstrates the effectiveness of imposing such liability on
manufacturers in providing cautionary practices to consumers. See Taylor v. Jacobson, 147
N.E.2d 770, 775-76 (1958); 6 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 453, § 86:5.
464. See 6 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 453, §§ 86:1-86:9 (discussing and citing a
majority of failure to warn cases).
465. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp. 882 P.2d 298, 307 (Cal. 1994) (citing West v. Johnson
& Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 458 (Ct. App. 1985)).
466. 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441-42 (Ct. App. 1985).
467. Id. at 445-47.
468. Id. at 458.
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raised a jury question of whether the product was more danger-
ous than the ordinary consumer would expect.
469
In Morson v. Superior Court, however, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the CET did not apply to the plaintiffs' allergic reac-
tions to the use of latex gloves in their work as health care pro-
fessionals.4 70 Apparently, upwards of ten percent of frequent
users of latex gloves suffer from the most severe type of allergic
reactions.471 The Morson court believed, however, that the proof
that plaintiffs proposed to submit at trial was not "relatively
straightforward." 472 The court said that "the subject of allergic
reactions is a complex biological and medical phenomenon" and
that "the alleged circumstances of the product's failure involve
technical and mechanical details about the operation of the man-
ufacturing process, and then the effect of the product upon an in-
dividual plaintiffs health."473 The court apparently confused the
defectiveness issue with the causation issue. The need for expert
causation testimony does not preclude the application of the CET
on the defectiveness issue. 4
Unde v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. involved the application of a facial
cream that allegedly made preexisting spots grow darker instead
of lighter.4 5 The plaintiff represented himself in the trial court
and on appeal. 76 The trial court granted summary judgment for
the defendant on the design-defect strict liability claim.477 On the
negligence claim, the plaintiff relied on his own testimony and
that of two witnesses that the spots on his face became darker af-
ter using the product. At the close of the plaintiffs evidence,
469. Id. at 456-58 (citing Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224, 232-33 (Cal.
1982)). Similarly, in Unde v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. C043002, 2004 WL 740034, at *6 (Cal.
Ct. App. 7 2004), involving an alleged adverse reaction from a facial cream, the court con-
fused the defectiveness issue with the causation issue.
470. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 345, 359 (Ct. App. 2001).
471. Barrett, supra note 463, at 266.
472. See Morson, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
473. Id. at 348, 356.
474. See Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 154 (Ct. App. 2005) (noting
that although expert testimony was needed to establish legal causation, it did not mean
that ordinary users would be unable to form assumptions about the product's safety).
475. Unde v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., No. C043002, 2004 WL 740034, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004).
476. Id.
477. See id. at *2.
478. See id.
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the trial court dismissed the negligence claim for lack of proof on
the standard of care and causation.479
The Court of Appeals, in considering the strict liability theory,
concluded that the CET did not apply and cited Morson, stating
that "courts have found the alleged creation or exacerbation of al-
lergies by a product beyond the purview of the consumer expecta-
tions test."4 0 The court also found that there was insufficient evi-
dence to raise a jury question on causation on the ground that
"the mere possibility that a defendant's conduct might have
caused a plaintiffs injury is not sufficient to establish causa-
tion."48' Unde is essentially a causation case, and the court never
properly analyzed the design-defect issue under the CET.
In asbestos exposure cases, on the other hand, California courts
have uniformly applied the CET in design-defect cases.4 82 While
asbestos obviously is not an intimate bodily use product, the as-
bestos cases pose a problem for the Morson reasoning. In Sparks
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the first asbestos design-defect case, the
court affirmed the jury's determination that the defendant was
liable based on the CET.483 Sparks involved the claim of a former
U.S. Navy metalsmith who was exposed repeatedly to asbestos
dust while inspecting pipes and pipelines aboard his ship.484 In
order to inspect the pipes, he had to remove the insulation, which
contained asbestos, from the valves by sawing or cutting it
away.485 This process, as well as the cleanup procedures involving
compressed air and brooms, generated a large amount of dust
that the plaintiff inhaled.486
479. See id.
480. Id. at *6 (citing Morson v. Super. Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 343, 359 (Ct. App. 2001)).
481. Id. at *7 (citing Spencer v. Beatty Safeway Scaffold Co., 297 P.2d 746, 751 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1956)). In Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., the plaintiff
asserted that she did not know at the time of surgery that saline implants have a tendency
to deflate over time. 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The court concluded that
breast implants were not within the common experience of ordinary consumers. Id. at
303-04. Thus, the court reasoned, expert testimony that surgeons knew that saline im-
plants were deflatable was admissible and could be relied on to conclude that the product
was not more dangerous than the ordinary user or consumer could expect. Id. at 304.
482. See, e.g., Morton v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 24-25 (Ct.
App. 1995).
483. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739, 748 (Ct. App. 1995).





Sparks involved a thermal insulation called Kaylo, containing
thirteen to twenty percent asbestos, which was available in pipe-
covering and block forms.487 It was intended for high temperature
thermal insulation and was commonly used on ships."s8 The court
held that the product failure was the emission of highly toxic,
respirable fibers in the normal course of the product's intended
use and maintenance.4 9 It reasoned that "[t]here were neither
'complicated design considerations,' nor 'obscure components,' nor
'esoteric circumstances' surrounding the 'accident' in the instant
case."49° The product was a "simple, stationary product in its or-
dinary uses" made of friable material that generated large
amounts of dust when cut to shape irregular objects during in-
stallation, removal, inspection, and replacement processes.491
There was a reasonable inference from the evidence that the
emission of fibers that cause a fatal lung disease after a long la-
tency period was a product failure "beyond the 'legitimate, com-
monly accepted minimum safety assumptions of its ordinary con-
sumers."'492 The Sparks court further analogized the case to West
v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., the tampon toxic shock
syndrome case.493 The court stated that, like in West, "the plaintiff
'had every right to expect' that use of such a seemingly innocuous
product 'would not lead to a serious (or perhaps fatal) illness.'4 94
Despite the decision in the Morson latex glove case, the Cali-
fornia courts have continued to apply the CET to asbestos cases.
The court in Cadlo v. Superior Court followed Sparks and held
that "[tihe design failure was in [the] emission of highly toxic,
respirable fibers in the normal course of [the product's] intended
use," which raised the reasonable inference that the products' de-
fect exceeded the "'legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safe-
ty assumptions of its ordinary consumers.' 495 The court distin-
487. Id. at 741.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 747-48.
490. Id. at 747.
491. Id.
492. Id. (quoting Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309 (Cal. 1994)).
493. See id. at 747 (citing West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437
(Ct. App. 1985)).
494. Id. at 38 (quoting West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 458
(Ct. App. 1985)).
495. Cadlo v. Super. Court, No. A109193, 2005 WL 459075 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Sparks, 38 Cal. Rptr., at 747).
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guished Morson on the grounds that the defect in Cadlo was seen
as the straightforward release of respirable toxic fibers that could
cause a fatal illness "during the routine and relatively
straightforward use and maintenance of defendants' products,"496
whereas the court in Morson described the defect as "far from
simple."'4 9
In Jones v. John Crane, Inc., another asbestos insulation case,
the court noted that even though expert testimony was needed to
establish legal causation of the injuries, it did not mean "that an
ordinary user of the product would be unable to form assumptions
about the safety of the products."49' The Jones court rejected the
application of Morson.499 Following Sparks, the courts have con-
tinued to approve the application of the CET in asbestos design-
defect cases. All of the cases apply essentially the same reasoning
as Sparks, and in most cases, directly cite the Sparks analysis. °0
In contrast to Morson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Green
v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., a design-defect case, applied the
CET to latex gloves." 1 The plaintiff, in her strict liability action,
alleged that the defective and unreasonably dangerous level of la-
tex proteins in the cornstarch-coated gloves caused her to have
allergic reactions and suffer serious injuries. °2 Her job as a CT
scan technologist required her to use up to forty pairs of gloves
per work shift." 3 Researchers found that seventy-five percent of
people reacted adversely to the high protein gloves, while only
seven percent reacted to the low protein gloves.0 4 Moreover, the
use of cornstarch to more easily don and remove the gloves in-
creased the risk that users would inhale the latex proteins when
combined with the cornstarch powder.5 5 This evidence was held
sufficient to raise a jury question under the CET. 66
496. Id. at *4.
497. Morson v. Super. Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 356 (Ct. App. 2001); see Cadlo,
2005 WL 459075, at *4.
498. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 154 (Ct. App. 2005).
499. Id.
500. See, e.g., Morton v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 24-25 (Ct.
App. 1995).
501. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 732-33, 743 (Wis. 2001).
502. Id. at 731-33.
503. Id. at 732.
504. Id. at 733.
505. Id. at 733-34 & n.5.
506. Id. at 731. At the time that the plaintiff began experiencing medical problems,
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Morson and other intimate bodily use product cases do present
a difficult substantive issue, namely that the design-defect ap-
proach under the CET and the warning-defect approach blend in-
to one another. Warning-defect cases at their core, after all, are
actually only a subspecies of design defects. On the one hand, it
makes sense to conclude that latex gloves, as supremely useful
products, should not be deemed defective if an adequate warning
can be provided to alert the small number of users subject to al-
lergic reactions to cease use before developing serious medical
disorders. In a warning-defect case, the plaintiff is required to
show that a substantial number of persons are adversely affected
by the use of the product;5 7 however, the defendant can defeat
causation by showing that the plaintiff knew of the responsible
agent for his or her medical difficulties and yet continued the ex-
posure. °8 If the plaintiff cannot prove the former, or if the defen-
dant can prove the latter, there is no liability.0 9 Conversely, in a
design-defect case under the CET, the plaintiff would not have to
introduce proof regarding the numbers of people likely to have se-
rious allergic reactions, and, furthermore, plaintiffs knowledge of
the cause of his or her medical ills would only be a comparative
fault defense. The dilemma of which paradigm to select is essen-
tially a choice between imposing either strict liability or fault as
the culpability standard for the manufacturer.
The California asbestos cases apply the common sense ap-
proach that a user's daily work with a product lacking apparent
risks or warnings creates an expectation that the product is rea-
sonably safe."' In the case of asbestos, the courts have concluded
that a reasonable inference can be drawn that the substance is
however, "the health care community was unaware that persons could be allergic to latex."
Id. at 752-53. The court concluded that "regardless of whether a manufacturer could fore-
see potential risks of harm inherent in its ... product, strict products liability holds that
manufacturer responsible for injuries caused by that product." Id. at 746.
Although products liability law is intended in part to make products safer for
consumers, the primary "rationale underlying the imposition of strict liability
on manufacturers and sellers is that the risk of the loss associated with the
use of defective products should be borne by those who have created the risk
and who have reaped the profit by placing a defective product in the stream
of commerce."
Id. at 750 (quoting Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872, 879 (Wis. 1990)).
507. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) & cmt. k (1998).
508. See id. § 2(c) & cmt. i.
509. See id. § 2(c) cmts. i, k.
510. See, e.g., Morton, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 22, 22-25 (Ct. App. 1995); Sparks v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739, 747-48 (Ct. App. 1995).
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defective, at least without warnings, and the danger exceeded the
"'legitimate, commonly accepted minimum safety assumptions of
its ordinary users."'51' The theory of the asbestos cases should be
applicable to intimate bodily use products. It is equally appropri-
ate for intimate bodily use products that an inference of design
defect be permitted from normal use which leads to injury, at
least without warnings. This application will encourage producers
of such products to thoroughly test their products before mass
production and to monitor closely reports of adverse reactions
once marketing has begun. 12
8. Deviation from Industry-Wide Safety Codes and Standards
There are numerous decisions that allow evidence of custom
deviation of industry and trade standards as relevant and persu-
asive proof of design defect. 13 The court in Frazier v. Continental
Oil Co. reasoned that these industry standards "generally
represent not merely the opinion of one expert in a particular
field but 'a consensus of opinion carrying the approval of a signifi-
cant segment of an industry."'5 4 Also, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed its commitment to allowing proof of a design
defect by evidence of the product design's lack of conformity to
"design guidelines provided by an authoritative voluntary associ-
ation."515
511. Sparks, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (quoting Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298,
309 (Cal. 1994)).
512. See Conk, supra note 77, at 872-73 (discussing how manufacturers of medical
products-socially important but high risk products-should be held to a higher standard).
513. See, e.g., Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 587 (5th Cir. 1985); Frazier v.
Cont'l Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1978); Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft,
Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1986); Brown v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711, 718 (Mont.
1978); Hansen v. Abrasive Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 856 P.2d 625, 628 (Or. 1993). A few courts
have held that custom deviation and compliance evidence are irrelevant in design-defect
strict liability actions because the issue is the defective character of the product-not the
conduct of the defendant. This distinction is without merit as shown earlier. See supra
Part III.B.3.a. In any event, this minority approach ignores the widespread acceptance of
risk-utility evidence to prove design defect in the safety adequacy cases. Once the door is
open in these cases to proof of feasible, safer, cost-effective alternative designs, custom
evidence is very relevant. See 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, § 17.85.
514. Frazier, 568 F.2d at 382 (quoting James L. Foutch, Comment, Admissibility of
Safety Codes, Rules and Standards in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REV. 581, 587 (1970)).
515. Mikolajcyzk v. Ford Motor Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 335 (Ill. 2008), (quoting Anderson
v. Hyster Co., 385 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Ill. 1979)).
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Standards such as those of the American National Standards
Institute, the National Electric Safety Code, Underwriters Labo-
ratoresi, and the recommendations of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission are so widely recognized and respected as
minimum standards of safety,516 that courts should recognize
product deviation from such industry-wide safety codes as an ad-
ditional category of sufficient alternative proof in design-defect
cases.517 This would be consistent with the reform objective of re-
ducing the burden of proof on claimants in products liability cas-
es. By overtly recognizing this category, the courts will assist
lawyers in recognizing that proof of such deviations is sufficient
to establish defectiveness and present the issue of safety expecta-
tions to the jury.
Additionally, if such safety code deviation proof is relevant to
the design and injury in question and was in effect at the time of
manufacture, then the burden of proof, as in negligence per se,
should shift to the defendant to justify the deviation. Justification
proof should not be allowed simply to debate the merits of the in-
dustry standard, but should be limited to those instances where
the defense asserts that the product design in question was more
advanced and safer than the industry standard. Manufacturer
compliance with industry standards, on the other hand, as in neg-
ligence law, should be relevant to the reasonableness of the de-
sign, but should not give rise to any presumptive effect, as the in-
dustry standard may not reflect optimum safety.518
516. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KEATING & THOMAS H. CASE, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
SERIES: DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMPLIANCE PROGRAM §§ 1:18,
1:23, 1:25 (2008); IEEE Standards Association, NESC Zone, http://standards.ieee.org/nesc/
index.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
517. See Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1047, 1063 (2002)
(discussing the consumer's right to expect that products comply with industry customs and
regulations).
518. See 2 Am. L. Prods. Liab. 3d, supra note 73, § 17:80. In Frazier, the Fifth Circuit
noted:
In holding admissible advisory materials promulgated by a governmental
agency, this Court's decision is in accord with the modern trend of cases find-
ing national safety codes representative of "a consensus of opinion carrying
the approval of a significant segment of an industry" and offerable as exem-
plifying safety practices prevailing in the industry. Courts have become in-
creasingly appreciative of the value of national safety codes and other guide-
lines issued by governmental and voluntary associations to assist the trier of
fact in applying the standard of due care in negligence cases. Though the law
is by no means settled, this Court finds that the inherent trustworthiness of
such codes and recommendations, coupled with the need for their introduc-
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VI. THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY COMMON LAW PROCESS
The products liability cases serve as a significant paradigm of
the modern era operation of the common law process. A major
attribute of the common law system is that judges do not have to
know the exact geography of a boundary when they first create a
distinction in the law. Thus, in placing the safety adequacy ba-
lancing cases on one side of the line, and the malfunction and
manifest defect-alternative-proof cases on the other side, the
courts did not have to understand the exact metes and bounds of
the distinction. It was left to lawyer advocacy and judicial insight
in later cases to determine if other categories of alternative proof
should be developed. The process is open-ended and as reason
and equity dictate, more categories can be added.519
The Restatement (Third) in section 2(b) provides that all de-
sign-defect cases require risk-utility proof with exceptions noted
only for the malfunction and safety regulation contexts.52 0 This
approach locks all products liability cases into a risk-utility evi-
dence mode even if circumstances equitably call for an alternative
proof approach. If section 2(b) were codified as legislation, it
would be classified as a closed-end system, and future elaboration
by the courts would be considerably restrained. Of course, legisla-
tion can be open-ended as well, allowing the courts to reason out
future categories, but this is becoming increasingly rare as a leg-
islative and interpretational phenomenon in the United States.2'
In Soule, California took the common law open-ended approach
and, for the last fifteen years, has allowed the lower courts to
work out the geography of the boundary between the design-
defect cases requiring risk-utility proof and those allowing alter-
native proof. 22 The open-ended approach expresses a continuing
faith in the common law system, relies on experience and reason
to elaborate the future rules, and utilizes private law-making
tion in order to impart relevant information not contained elsewhere, is suffi-
cient to justify their admission, notwithstanding the traditional dangers of
hearsay evidence.
568 F.2d at 382 (quoting Muncie Aviation Corp. v. Party Doll Fleet, Inc., 519 F.2d
1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1975)).
519. See Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on
Twenty Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1032 (2000).
520. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. § 2(b) & cmt. d (1998).
521. See generally Zollers et al., supra note 519, at 1026-33.
522. See Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 309-10 (Cal. 1994).
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through lawyer advocacy to work out additional rules of law.
Where there is long experience with a legal problem, the closed-
ended approach is most appropriate for setting the boundaries in
order to settle matters fairly and to avoid litigation. But where
there is insufficient experience with the types of cases that may
subsequently present themselves, an open-ended solution works
best.
In the California courts, the experience with the two-prong ap-
proach demonstrates the wisdom of using an open-ended system
for situations where product users have developed minimum safe-
ty expectations that should be governed by alternative proof re-
quirements. This article has also suggested several other catego-
ries for consideration. One clear lesson of the strict products
liability experience is that we were not able to foresee at the time
of the adoption of section 402A the many ramifications and com-
plications that subsequently unfolded. We may not be there yet.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the proof required and allowed in
various types of design-defect categories. Risk-utility evidence is
generally required in the safety adequacy design-defect cases, and
alternative proof is allowed in a range of other design-defect cate-
gories. Understanding this duality provides order and clarity in
design-defect law. It also allows the common law process to con-
tinue to work on refining and identifying the alternative proof
categories.
An understanding of the alternative proof categories in design-
defect law is helpful for at least four important reasons: (1) it
provides guidance to courts in understanding the applicable legal
test and the appropriate instructions to give juries; (2) it enables
attorneys to plan and develop more easily the requisite legal and
evidentiary strategy for their cases; (3) it allows products liability
law to develop in a more sensible and coherent fashion; and (4) it
allows us to understand that the original objectives of Justice
Francis, Justice Traynor, and Dean Prosser in developing strict
products liability reform are applicable to some design-defect cas-
es. Isolating this boundary line allows strict liability to remain an
important standard in alternative proof cases while negligence
principles apply in substance in other design-defect cases requir-
ing risk-utility proof.
20091 1457

